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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF BIG DATA 
Dru Stevenson* & Nicholas J. Wagoner** 
Abstract 
Attorney bargaining has traditionally taken place in the shadow of trial 
as litigants adjust tactics—and their inclination to negotiate a 
settlement—based on their forecast of the outcome of a trial and its 
associated costs. Lawyers bargaining on the verge of trial have 
traditionally relied on their intuition, knowledge of precedent, and 
previous interactions with the presiding judge and opposing counsel to 
forecast trial outcomes and litigation costs. Today, however, technology 
that leverages legal data is moving the practice of law into the shadow of 
the trends and patterns apparent in aggregated litigation data. This Article 
describes the tools that facilitate this paradigm shift and examines how 
lawyers use these tools to forecast litigation outcomes and reduce 
Coasean bargaining costs in both litigation and transactional fields. This 
Article also explores some of the risks associated with bargaining in the 
shadow of big data, and it offers guidance to lawyers leveraging these 
tools to improve their practice.  
This discussion pushes beyond the cartoonish image of big data as a 
mechanical fortuneteller—predicting who will win or lose a case, 
supposedly eliminating research or deliberation. This Article also 
debunks the alarmist clichés about newfangled technologies eliminating 
jobs. Demand for lawyers who are capable of effective bargaining when 
confronted by big data will continue to increase as the legal profession 
catches up to the data-centric approach found in other industries. 
Ultimately, this Article paints a portrait of what big data really means for 
practicing attorneys, and it provides a framework for exploring the 
theoretical implications of lawyering in the era of information analytics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man 
of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
master of economics.” 
 
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.1 
                                                                                                                     
 * Hutchins Research Professor, South Texas College of Law; Baker Institute Scholar, 
James A. Baker III Institute at Rice University. Many thanks to my institution for providing 
support for this research, and to Josh Blackman, Matt Festa, and Val Ricks for helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
 ** I would like to thank Daniel Lewis of Ravel Law and Owen Byrd of Lex Machina for 
sharing with me their experiences in their work at startups focused on developing software that 
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The practice of law includes prediction. Clients expect their lawyers 
to answer questions like “What are the odds of winning this case, and 
what is it going to cost me?”2 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. observed 
this fact more than a century ago when he wrote that “[t]he prophecies of 
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I 
mean by the law.”3 
Today, practitioners still resemble Holmes’s “black-letter men” of 
yesteryear more than they resemble the number-crunching masters of 
economics that Holmes had envisioned. The vast majority of attorneys 
still rely solely on their own experience, knowledge of case precedents, 
and intuition to predict what the courts will actually do.4 But as mere 
mortals, attorneys—even the exceptional ones—are inherently limited in 
their capacity to retain and process the information necessary to make 
well-informed judgments. Likewise, attorneys have a limited range of 
personal experience. Computers, on the other hand, while lacking the 
ability to frame interesting questions or draw conclusions, are far better 
at storing, processing, and summarizing large volumes of information. 
Thus, by leveraging the quantitative strength of computers, lawyers can 
more accurately forecast how events will play out in litigation. This 
foresight, in turn, will allow lawyers and their clients to avoid costly 
mistakes, better appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, 
and increase their odds of securing favorable outcomes. 
Others in the legal academy have already begun discussing the value 
of basing decisions on big data, though not necessarily in the context of 
lawyering. Professor Ian Ayres recently popularized the term “super 
crunching,” referring to the statistical analysis of big data to guide real-
                                                                                                                     
will facilitate lawyering in the shadow of data. I would also like to thank Keith Lee and Josh 
Blackman for providing thoughtful commentary on earlier drafts of this Article. 
 1. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
 2. Tam Harbert, Big Data Meets Big Law, L. TECH. NEWS (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202555605051/Big-Data-Meets-Big-Law?slreturn=201502 
23103023 (LEXIS subscription required); see also Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal 
Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven 
Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L. J. 909, 912 (2013) (“Do I have a case? What 
is our likely exposure? How much is this going to cost? What will happen if we leave this 
particular provision out of this contract? How can we best staff this particular legal matter? These 
are core questions asked by sophisticated clients such as general counsels, as well as consumers 
at the retail level.”); Farhad Manjoo, Will Robots Steal Your Job?: Software Could Kill Lawyers, 
SLATE (Sept. 29, 2011, 2:42 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/robot_invasion/2011/09/will 
_robots_steal_your_job_5.html (“The legal industry is one of the few remaining outposts of the 
corporate world whose operations are dictated mainly by human experience. Basic questions that 
anyone would want to know before committing to a million-dollar case—How likely is it that I’ll 
win? How good are my lawyers? Should I settle?—can’t be answered with certainty.”). 
 3. Holmes, supra note 1, at 461. 
 4. See CLARENCE MORRIS, HOW LAWYERS THINK 11–19 (1938). 
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world decisions.5 Super crunching improves decision-making by 
leveraging the quantitative strength of computers so that human users 
may spend more time doing what they do best—identifying relevant data 
to crunch, formulating questions to ask of their data, and then acting on 
the results.6 
In popular culture and semiotics, Moneyball7 has become the 
vernacular shorthand for data-driven decisions. In 2002, after making a 
fortune in finance by analyzing data to uncover and exploit inefficiencies 
in the financial markets, John Henry led a group of investors in the 
purchase of the Boston Red Sox baseball franchise.8 Using the data-
driven principles that Professor Ayres would later espouse in Super 
Crunchers, Henry built a team that went on to win the 2004 World Series 
and break the “Curse of the Bambino.”9 In a letter to a friend, he 
explained: “People in both fields operate with beliefs and biases. To the 
extent you can eliminate both and replace them with data, you gain a clear 
advantage.”10  
Henry’s insight applies equally to the practice of law.11 Lawyers, just 
like decision makers in every other field, operate with beliefs and biases 
that can cloud their judgment.12 Yet more than a century ago, Justice 
Holmes pointed out a better path to predicting the law than that traveled 
by today’s “black-letter man,” a path that leads to a future where “the 
rational study of the law” requires a “man of statistics and master of 
economics.”13 Like Henry’s Boston Red Sox, lawyers who embrace data-
driven decision-making will gain a clear advantage over their 
                                                                                                                     
 5. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 10 (2007). 
 6. See id. 
 7. MICHAEL M. LEWIS, MONEYBALL (2003). 
 8. DAN SHAUGHNESSY, REVERSING THE CURSE: INSIDE THE 2004 BOSTON RED SOX 60 
(2005). 
 9. Id. at 1.  
 10. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 90–91.  
 11. See generally Charles J. Snyder, Moneyball Lawyering, 65 ARK. L. REV. 837, 840–41 
(2012). 
 12. See Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 805, 826 (2008); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1221 (1975) (discussing how defense attorneys’ biases and 
rapport with prosecutors can influence outcomes for defendants); Stephanos Bibas, Plea 
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2528–29 (2004); Darryl K. 
Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 801, 827 (2004); Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The 
Problem of Prediction, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1847, 1868–75 (demonstrating that lawyers’ decision-
making is affected by cognitive bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case 
for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1217 n.274 (2003) (discussing cognitive biases for 
lawyers); Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1588–89 
(2007); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1172 n.288 (2010). But 
see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 345–46 (2012).  
 13. Holmes, supra note 1, at 469. 
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counterparts who still cling to their Dictaphones, feather-quilled pens, 
and thumb-in-the-air predictions when handling their clients’ legal 
affairs. 
Why then, has most of the legal profession not yet found the path 
envisioned by Justice Holmes? The profession lags behind most other 
industries in crunching data to improve its marketing and delivery of 
services. The historical inaccessibility of litigation data and the 
inadequacy of the tools with which lawyers presently conduct legal 
research have created a significant bottleneck to progress.14  
This is not to say that legal practitioners have not embraced modern 
technology. To the contrary, law firms were early adopters of office 
computers and word processors, scheduling and billing software, in-
house networks, conference phones, and online databases like Lexis and 
Westlaw. Before smartphones became ubiquitous, lawyers commonly 
had PDA’s to keep track of appointments, hourly billing, and client 
contacts.  
But “big data” is different. Previous technological advances mostly 
made firms more efficient at the tasks that they were already doing—
scheduling meetings, drafting documents, sharing ideas, and looking up 
cases. A few technologies considerably changed how lawyers approached 
a task. The most obvious example of this was the profession’s massive 
shift in the early 1980s toward precision-timed billing—in minutes or 
fractions of hours—rather than ball-parked or “scheduled” fees once 
computer software made such time-tracking more feasible.15 For the most 
part, however, the underlying nature of the work remained largely the 
same—researching, writing, and meeting with clients and opposing 
counsel—and the technology merely made these tasks more convenient 
or allowed lawyers to handle more cases. Even the research that attorneys 
now perform through Lexis and Westlaw is analytically analogous to the 
old approach in law libraries—finding cases in bound digests and reports 
as compared to using intricate indexing systems like West’s Keys or 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Anastasia Boyko, The Costs of (Inefficient) Legal Services Delivery, N.Y. ST. B. 
ASS’N J., Sept. 2012, at 34, 36. 
 15. See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 127 (6th ed. 2004); 
Ed Wesemann, Full Circle: Alternative Pricing, 70 OR. ST. B. BULL. 38, 38 (2010) (“The 
popularity of billing by the hour was supported by technology, first through ‘one-write’ record 
books, then electronic accounting machines, and eventually, computers until it became the pricing 
standard for the legal profession.”); H. Edward Wesemann, The Power of Price, 23 LEGAL MGMT. 
22, 34–35 (2004) (“The billing-by-the-hour trend didn’t earnestly begin until the 1960s, and it 
took computers to bring firms to complete dependence on hourly billing.”). Ironically, even as 
computers facilitated the entrenchment of hourly billing, the advent of computers prompted 
leaders in the legal profession to predict that computers would also force the demise of time-based 
fees, as the new efficiency would make legal tasks too brief to generate sufficient time-based 
revenue. See, e.g., Sandra L. Yost, Alternative Billing Strategies—New Wave or Passing Fad?, 
13 LEGAL MGMT. 18, 20 (1994) (discussing comments by state bar leaders at panel discussions 
about the impact of computers on alternate billing strategies).  
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Lexis’s Headnotes.  
Big data, by contrast, invites lawyers to make a fundamental change 
in their approach to the law itself by looking to statistical patterns, 
predictors, and correlations, in addition to the legal rules that purportedly 
control outcomes—case law, statutory law, procedural rules, and 
administrative regulations. Traditional lawyering required knowledge of 
the pertinent legal rules and the ability to apply them to a given set of 
facts, whether in litigation or in transactional work. This application of 
law to facts would yield an estimate about probabilities: that is, a 
prediction of the likelihood that a given rule would govern a given 
scenario. The question was whether a feature of the client’s current 
situation would trigger a rule and its mandatory result. Analogies, 
comparisons, and normative judgments all figured into this assessment. 
A lawyer’s fees reflected, in theory, the time and resources required to 
determine the relevant law and analyze the likely outcome.  
Big data turns this approach on its head. Rather than assuming that 
rules dictate outcomes as the basis for making specific predictions, big 
data looks for patterns and correlations. For example, historical litigation 
data in the aggregate might reveal a judge’s tendency to grant or deny 
certain types of pretrial motions, an opponent’s historical avoidance of 
expert witnesses, or a party’s typical timing for settlements. These details 
may be more relevant for a client or a lawyer than the published court 
opinions in prior cases that ran the full course of litigation.  
Coasean bargaining between attorneys traditionally took place in the 
shadow of the trial, a result of the fact that litigants alter their pretrial 
behavior, including their willingness to negotiate a settlement, based on 
their perception of the likely outcome at trial and the anticipated cost to 
get there.16 Traditionally, lawyers have formed their perception of the 
relative strength of their clients’ cases based on case precedents, their 
prior experience handling similar cases, and interactions with the 
presiding judge and opposing counsel. Today, however, the availability 
of tools for leveraging legal data is increasingly moving bargaining into 
the shadow of the trends and patterns observable in aggregated litigation 
data.  
What exactly does this mean for the legal profession? A traditional 
lawyer with many years of experience would acquire awareness of some 
relevant patterns, tendencies, and habits—the fact that certain judges 
were always severe; certain lawyers were more affable than others, even 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (discussing “the impact of the legal 
system on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom” in divorce cases and “the 
primary function of contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as 
providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their post-
dissolution rights and responsibilities”). 
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as opposing counsel; certain parties were unusually litigious; certain 
courthouses were painfully slow, for example. Such experiential 
knowledge supplemented the lawyer’s knowledge of the legal rules, and 
these personal factors could sometimes matter more than the legal rules 
themselves. Seasoned lawyers practiced not just in the shadow of the trial, 
but also in the shadow of the traits and tendencies of everyone involved.  
Ironically, these intangible aspects of traditional lawyering are the 
most analogous to lawyering in the shadow of big data. The new 
technology, however, makes available within minutes insights that once 
might have taken thirty years of practice experience to acquire. The latest 
legal-data services available to practitioners yield accurate statistical 
information about the preferences, persistence, and pace of the judges, 
parties, and lawyers involved in a matter. Big (legal) data not only 
compresses the time component of such knowledge from decades to 
minutes, but it also dramatically expands the breadth of potential 
observations.17 That is to say, a lawyer can now “profile” complete 
strangers from other jurisdictions for factors the lawyer has never before 
encountered in his limited circle of acquaintances. 
At the outset, one should dispense with the cartoonish image of big 
data as a mechanical arbitrator or adjudicator that will simply tell lawyers 
which party will win or lose a case, eliminating the need to do any 
research or give the matter much thought. To the contrary, big data 
potentially makes the lawyer’s job much more complicated and nuanced. 
Working in the shadow of data poses more ambiguity, both normative 
and positive, than working in the shadow of trials, which, in turn, occur 
in the shadow of rules. In fact, big data poses a new set of hazards or 
perils for its users. The line dividing successful from unsuccessful 
attorneys will shift from those skilled in “reading” the other parties to a 
lawsuit in the traditional sense of the word toward those familiar with the 
capabilities and limitations of lawyering with the aid of big data. 
Specifically, the lawyers of tomorrow will know when patterns in 
litigation data make predictions, when predictions run the risk of 
becoming self-negating or self-fulfilling, and when to reduce their 
exposure to the systemic risks that will inevitably result from more 
attorneys beginning to practice law overshadowed by data.  
This Article also proposes to move beyond the tired clichés about 
newfangled technologies eliminating jobs. It is a truism that automation 
replaces the workers who once manually performed the newly automated 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Matthew Chin, New Data Compression Method Reduces Big-Data Bottleneck; 
Outperforms, Enhances JPEG: New Discovery Is Rooted in Physics and the Arts, UCLA 
NEWSROOM (Dec. 18, 2003), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-research-team-invents-new-
249693. 
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task.18 These authors believe, like many economists, that automation 
eventually shifts the workforce elsewhere, to other nonautomated tasks, 
rather than demobilizing any section of the workforce permanently. Some 
legal tasks, like document review, are becoming increasingly automated, 
meaning associate attorneys are in less demand for such tasks;19 but these 
authors believe that demand for associates who can handle data-driven 
lawyering will continue to increase as the legal profession catches up to 
the data-centric approach to information utilized in other industries. 
The thrust of this Article is that lawyering in the shadow of data is 
qualitatively different than the technology-enhanced lawyering of 
previous decades. This Article attempts to take a more theoretical 
approach than previous literature in this area in order to paint a picture of 
what big data really means for lawyers and judges, and it aims to debunk 
some common misperceptions along the way. It includes a description of 
the newest legal-technology startups and some predictions about 
anticipated market entrants in the near future. In addition, this Article 
defines—for the first time—some of the hazards inherent in basing legal 
decisions on historical data that other commentators have largely 
overlooked. Some of these hazards are normative, but most of them are 
descriptive and theoretical. The intent of these authors is not to 
discourage the use of big data, but rather to help the legal profession 
understand the advantages and pitfalls of lawyering in the shadow of such 
data. 
The ensuing discussion proceeds along a standard roadmap: Part I will 
familiarize readers with the very recent technological upheaval in the 
American legal profession and will discuss the emergence of the “law-
as-data” movement that has resulted. This discussion includes a brief 
overview of PACER and the commercial alternatives. Part II then delves 
into the nature of legal “predictions” that big data will enable and 
attempts to define the value and limitations of such data-driven 
predictions. This Part contains the crux of this Article’s argument: that 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Some have argued that the legal profession historically has been hesitant to embrace 
any new technologies because reduced hours—through automation—would reduce billable 
revenue. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1, 30 (1991) (“A more troubling reason for the widespread failure of attorneys to use word 
processors may be that managers of law firms fear that the time saved by use of computers would 
result in a net reduction of billable hours.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Ed Poll, Technology Investments and Two-Handed Decision Making: How to 
Determine ROI When Considering Hardware and Software Upgrades, 30 NO. 4 LEGAL MGMT. 
52, 54 (2011) (“E-discovery software can analyze documents required for litigation discovery in 
a fraction of the time for a fraction of the cost when compared to using lawyers for the task.”); 
John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/science/05legal.html (“Now, thanks to advances 
in artificial intelligence, ‘e-discovery’ software can analyze documents in a fraction of the time 
for a fraction of the cost.”). 
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big data significantly enhances Coasean bargaining by lowering 
information costs, which traditionally formed the most easily identifiable 
transaction costs for purposes of Coasean analysis of legal transactions 
and disputes. Part III initiates a long-overdue discussion about the 
theoretical problems with predictions and forecasts, and about lingering 
uncertainty in the legal arena. An important Section in Part III addresses 
the special problem of “Black Swans”—unforeseeable systemic risks that 
creep in as information-based decision-making allows tighter integration 
and coordination of independent players in the system. This Article 
concludes with a concise recap of the main points and suggestions of 
areas for further research. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part discusses the very recent technological upheaval in the 
American legal profession, as well as the emergence of the “law-as-data” 
movement that has resulted. This discussion includes a brief overview of 
PACER as a means of accessing legal data and the commercial 
alternatives thereto. 
A.  Intuition is Overrated 
Lawyers, like accountants, doctors, and any other professionals, are 
human. Human nature tends toward clouded judgment from the 
interference of cognitive biases and emotion in the decision-making 
process.20 Lawyers are often unaware of the subtle saboteurs of 
rationality that have infiltrated their subconscious thought.21 Their range 
of experiences and finite capacity to retain information also inherently 
limit practitioners’ thinking.22 The ability to make sound judgments takes 
years of practice to develop and a lifetime to master.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 81 (2d ed. 1957) 
(describing the limits of “objective rationality”); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 25–26 (2008) 
(explaining how cognitive biases and question framing skew decisions). 
 21. See JÜRGEN T. REHM & VOLKER GADENNE, INTUITIVE PREDICTIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
FORECASTS: COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 73–74 (1990). 
 22. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2519–20. The same is true, of course, for judges. See 
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 553–54 
(2012) (“Justices operate on limited information; because there are no sensible algorithmic 
methods of deciding difficult cases, most constitutional decisions have only weak claims to 
objective validity; the parts of the Constitution that generate litigation at the Supreme Court level 
are too old and general to be directive; the issues presented in constitutional cases tend to be both 
emotional and momentous and the decisions resolving them inescapably reflect the Justices’ 
personal values, psychology, background, peer pressures, political anxieties, 
professional experiences, ideological inclinations, and other non-legalistic factors, often operating 
unconsciously . . . .”). 
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Data, on the other hand, is indifferent. It is impartial. It can be 
comprehensive in scope where lawyers are limited in experience. Data 
does not care whether it is consistent with someone’s preconceived 
notions or personal experiences, nor is it particularly concerned with 
intuition. Rather, data is simply a historical reflection of reality. It seems 
rather obvious, then, that aggregated data about relevant, past litigation 
should play a key role in informing the inherently subjective judgment of 
lawyers—a “reality check,” so to speak. 
Yet lawyers continue to rely mostly on their experience,23 intuition,24 
and instinct.25 This approach to legal decision-making is problematic for 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See Brandon J. Harrison, The Lawyer as a Professional Writer, 62 ARK. L. REV. 725, 
739–40 (2009) (encouraging lawyers to draw on their life experiences); Patrick E. Longan, 
Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. 
REV. 712, 726 (1994) (emphasizing the value of practitioner experience in mediation). 
 24. In 1993, the American Bar Association published the results of a study in which roughly 
3000 lawyers were asked to take a Myers–Briggs Type Indicator test to measure the personality 
types prevalent in the profession. Larry Richard, The Lawyer Types, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 74, 
74. The study’s results showed that although a mere thirty percent of the general U.S. population 
indicated that they relied primarily on their intuition rather than concrete facts, fifty-seven percent 
of lawyers were inclined to trust their intuition over concrete facts when making decisions. Id. at 
76. This may be due in large part to the fact that lawyers often make judgment calls based on 
incomplete facts and perhaps are more accustomed to wrestling with ambiguity than the general 
population.  
 25. Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial and 
Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 706 (1998) 
(“Attorneys rely on instinct and experience . . . .”); Sally E. Anderson, Special Considerations for 
Sole and Small Firm Practitioners, 32 WYO. LAW. 50, 56 (2009) (“Most importantly, a lawyer 
must trust his or her instincts.”); Robert A. Caplen, When Batson Met Grutter: Exploring the 
Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Diversity Pronouncements Within the Computerized Jury 
Selection Paradigm, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 65, 70 (2007) (“Lawyers often rely upon hunches, 
instinct, and educated guesswork, none of which are exact.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); William R. Dailey, Who is the Attorney General’s Client?, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1113, 1125 (2012) (“Presumably, a lawyer must still rely on her own instincts about how far 
to follow precedent, and so an account of precedent is bound to be part of any given lawyer’s own 
‘best view’ of the law, and the subjective element does not appear to be eliminated by requiring a 
‘due’ respect for precedent.”); Alan C. Eidsness & Lisa T. Spencer, Confronting Ethical Issues in 
Practice: The Trial Lawyer’s Dilemma, 45 FAM. L.Q. 21, 27 (2011) (“[L]awyers should trust their 
instincts . . . .”); Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey, The Roles of Counsel for the Parent in 
Child Dependency Proceeding, 22 GA. L. REV. 1079, 1099 (1988) (“To be sure, much of case 
selection must rely on attorney instincts and experience . . . .”); Gerry Riskin, Stealth 
Discrimination: A Model for Choosing and Managing Your Leaders, 20 OF COUNS. 16, 18 (2001) 
(“My advice is to forget the labored refinements of lawyering. Trust your visceral instincts. Go 
with your hunches.”); William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique 
of Some Academic Perspectives, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1000 (2010) (“In locating the 
‘bounds of the law’ for the purpose of counseling their clients, lawyers instinctively rely on 
principles, policies, and informal norms.”); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 173 (1950) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The common instinct of men for fair dealing and the experience of trial 
lawyers alike reject this holding.”). 
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several reasons. Intuition takes years to develop.26 To make matters 
worse, studies have shown that lawyers are generally overconfident when 
assessing their likelihood of success,27 and that the accuracy with which 
lawyers can predict outcomes does not improve with experience.28  
Considering what is at stake, it seems imprudent to rely on experience, 
intuition, or instinct alone in predicting the path of the law. As the next 
Section will explain, however, lawyers are not entirely to blame. Only 
recently have economic, technological, and political forces come together 
to form the perfect storm for introducing the legal profession to a new, 
data-driven approach to practicing law.  
B.  Innovation in the Legal Industry 
This Article is set against the backdrop of the economic turmoil that 
has rocked the legal profession in recent years, the disruptive technology 
that is reshaping the decision-making processes in other industries, and 
the growing body of free and easily accessible legal data that now exists. 
For nearly a century, the practice of law remained partly sheltered from 
the winds of technological change that have swept through other 
industries in the recent past. That all changed in 2008 as some of the 
nation’s largest white-shoe law firms collapsed under the crushing weight 
of overhead costs that clients could no longer afford to subsidize.29 Many 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See generally MARC J. DOLLINGER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: STRATEGIES & RESOURCES 34 
(4th ed. 2008); Elisha Babad, Michael Hills, & Michael O’Driscoll, Factors Influencing Wishful 
Thinking and Predictions of Election Outcomes, 13 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 461, 474 
(1992); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 487 (1990); 
Thomas A. Langens, Regulatory Focus and Illusions of Control, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 226, 226 (2007); Neil D. Weinstein, Reducing Unrealistic Optimism About 
Illness Susceptibility, 2 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 11, 12 (1983); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism 
About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 441, 443 (1982); Neil D. Weinstein, 
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 
(1980).  
 27. Some have suggested that this is due in part to the fact that overconfidence is a necessary 
trait to attract and retain clients. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions 
of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 450 (1988); see also William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1139 (1988); Jack W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in the 
Desirability of Alternatives, 52 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 389 (1956) (examining 
cognitive dissonance in the realm of alternative choices). 
 28. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict 
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133 (2010). 
 29. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 751–52; Steven 
Pearlstein, Why Howrey Law Firm Could Not Hold It Together, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-19/business/35207602_1_law-firm-howrey-simon-
robert-ruyak (observing that that rising overhead costs and fee cuts demanded by clients 
precipitated the 2011 collapse of the Howrey law firm, which “appeared to the outside world to 
be a thriving global enterprise with more than 700 lawyers” just two years earlier); James B. 
Stewart, Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firms’ New Reality, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012), 
11
Stevenson and Wagoner: Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1348 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
more law firms have experienced dramatic downsizing in recent years.30 
With more empty chairs at the office and tighter lines of credit at the 
bank, law firms searched desperately for a cheaper alternative to rehiring 
costly junior associates when legal grunt work—document review—
picked back up.31 
Many law firms were quick to embrace e-discovery software, which 
automated the process of reviewing documents for relevancy with greater 
accuracy than human reviewers at a fraction of the cost.32 As a result, the 
e-discovery-services industry sprang up virtually overnight, raking in 
revenue of approximately $2.8 billion in 2009 alone.33 It was not long 
before the New York Times picked up on the significance of this shift 
toward automated legal services, heralding a day that many in the legal 
profession thought would never come, with a headline that read, “Armies 
of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software.”34  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/business/deweys-collapse-underscores-a-new-reality-for-
law-firms-common-sense.html. 
 30. See John B. Attanasio, Facing Challenging Economic Times Head On, 74 TEX. B.J. 
138, 139 (2011); Richard W. Bourne, The Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, 
and Where We Go Now, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 651, 658 (2012) (“From the beginning of January 
2008 through November 2009, one website counted 14,940 layoffs from ‘major law firms,’ 
including 5,820 attorneys and 9,120 ‘staff’ (comprising staff attorneys and contract attorneys as 
well as non-lawyer personnel), and the number of attorneys in the National Law Journal . . . 250 
decreased 4.3% in 2009 and another 1.1% in 2010.”); Ted Enarson, Lateral Screening: Why Your 
State Should Not Adopt Amended Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 
9 n.40 (2012); Luz E. Herrera, Training Lawyer-Entrepreneurs, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 887, 887 n.1 
(2012); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1949, 1953 (2012); Nathan Koppel, Recession Batters Law Firms, 
Triggering Layoffs, Closings, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2009, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123292954232713979; Karen Sloan, Another Week, Another 
Round of Firm Layoffs: In First Two Months of the Year, Legal Sector Loses 5,500 Jobs, NAT’L 
L.J. (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202429069191/Another-week-
another-round-of-firm-layoffs (LEXIS subscription required) (describing staff and 
lawyer layoffs at several law firms). 
 31. See generally Manjoo, supra note 2 (“E-discovery software has been similarly 
revolutionary. These systems can mine huge volumes of material (like all the email 
correspondence in a civil suit) for damning evidence. The simplest software looks for specific 
keywords, but more sophisticated systems can detect patterns of behavior that might interest 
lawyers. This was the sort of work that once consumed the lives of first-year associates; now 
computers do it faster, at lower cost, and with about as much success as humans.”). 
 32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 33. Arin Greenwood, A New View, Part 2: E-Discovery Changes Have Some Seeing a 
Career in Document Review, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2011, at 27, 27–28. 
 34. Markoff, supra note 19. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/7
2015] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF BIG DATA 1349 
 
C.  Law as Data 
This Section discusses the emergence of the “law-as-data” movement. 
It starts with a look at the rise of data in other sectors of industry, and 
then discusses the way the legal sector interacts with this rising tide of 
information. Finally, it examines reasons and means for the legal 
profession’s close relationship with this data in litigation. 
1.  Big Data in Disparate Domains 
While technological innovation has crept into certain discrete facets 
of the legal profession, it has dramatically improved other sectors of the 
economy. Technology giants like Google, Amazon, and Facebook have 
demonstrated the great value of making the world’s information more 
useful and accessible. Even traditional brick-and-mortar industry leaders 
like Wal-Mart and General Electric now heavily rely on sophisticated 
computer networks and software to collect, store, distill, and act on the 
deluge of data that pours into their servers daily.35 The ability to crunch 
big data in this manner largely stems from two recent developments: the 
abundance of data that now exists and the emergence of software that 
makes it more accessible and useful.36 
So what exactly is big data? For some, it is a tired cliché, nothing more 
than “[a] meme and a marketing term.”37 For others, it is like gold38 or 
the new oil—“valuable, but if unrefined it cannot really be used.”39 
National Public Radio likened big data to dust: using a cell phone, 
browsing the web, buying groceries, connecting with friends on 
Facebook, driving with a toll tag—each day “[w]e kick up clouds of it 
wherever we go.”40 The McKinsey Global Institute defined the term more 
formally as “large pools of data that can now be captured, communicated, 
aggregated, stored, and analyzed.”41 However one describes or defines 
big data, there is no denying that its time has come.42 “[T]he world 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See The Data Deluge, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15579717. 
 36. AYRES, supra note 5, at 138; Katz, supra note 2, at 913–14. 
 37. Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Michael Palmer, Data is the New Oil, ANA MARKETING MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 
AM), http://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html. 
 40. Geoff Nunberg, Forget YOLO: Why ‘Big Data’ Should Be the Word of the Year, NPR 
(Dec. 20, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/20/167702665/geoff-nunbergs-word-of-
the-year-big-data. 
 41. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR 
INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY, at iv (2011), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research
/Technology%20and%20Innovation/Big%20Data/MGI_big_data_full_report.ashx. 
 42. See Lohr, supra note 37. 
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contains an unimaginably vast amount of digital information which is 
getting ever vaster ever more rapidly.”43 Thanks to a phenomenon known 
as Kryder’s Law, storage capacity has dramatically increased in step with 
the explosion of data, while its cost continues to fall.44 
The abundance of data and the increasing capacity of computers to 
store it are only half of the equation. The other half consists of computers 
that are now capable of scouring big data for patterns that might help 
human analysts solve problems and answer questions. Baseball teams 
crunch obscure statistics to spot undervalued players.45 President Barack 
Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign identified likely donors and 
undecided voters by combing through mountains of polling data.46 
Commercial industries as diverse as healthcare,47 national defense,48 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/15557443.  
 44. Katz, supra note 2, at 916. 
 45. LEWIS, supra note 7, at xiv. 
 46. Michael Scherer, Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama 
Win, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secret-world-of-
quants-and-data-crunchers-who-helped-obama-win/2/. The article concluded:  
That data-driven decisionmaking played a huge role in creating a second term 
for the 44th President and will be one of the more closely studied elements of the 
2012 cycle. It’s another sign that the role of the campaign pros in Washington 
who make decisions on hunches and experience is rapidly dwindling, being 
replaced by the work of quants and computer coders who can crack massive data 
sets for insight. As one official put it, the time of “guys sitting in a back room 
smoking cigars, saying ‘We always buy 60 Minutes’” is over. In politics, the era 
of big data has arrived. 
Id. 
 47. See generally PETER GROVES ET AL., CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH REFORM BUS. TECH. OFFICE, 
THE “BIG DATA” REVOLUTION IN HEALTHCARE: ACCELERATING VALUE AND INNOVATION 1 (Jan. 
2013), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/
healthcare%20systems%20and%20services/pdfs/the_big_data_revolution_in_healthcare.ashx. 
 48. Chris Young, Military Intelligence Redefined: Big Data in the Battlefield, FORBES (Mar. 
12, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2012/03/12/military-intelligence-
redefined-big-data-in-the-battlefield/. 
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fraud detection,49 travel,50 online dating,51 telecommunications,52 oil and 
gas,53 and banking54 have enjoyed similar benefits by figuring out how to 
capture and glean insight from the deluge of domain-specific data that 
now exists.  
The legal profession has been noticeably absent from the parade of 
progress that has led to valuable breakthroughs in other industries. It 
seems anomalous that “a singularly information-dependent profession” 
like the legal profession would arrive late to the age of big data.55 Some 
commentators have suggested that lawyers have resisted technological 
progress for fear that efficiency gains might decrease the number of 
billable hours for which they may charge their clients.56 While some 
lawyers may indeed harbor such unsavory motives for resisting 
innovation, this Article suggests that the best attorneys welcome new 
solutions that let them perform at an even higher level for a greater 
number of clients. The more plausible explanation for the lack of big-data 
solutions in the legal-research space is the historical inaccessibility of 
legal data, as discussed below. 
                                                                                                                     
 49. See The Data Deluge, supra note 35 (“Credit-card companies monitor every purchase 
and can identify fraudulent ones with a high degree of accuracy, using rules derived by crunching 
through billions of transactions. Stolen credit cards are more likely to be used to buy hard liquor 
than wine, for example, because it is easier to fence. Insurance firms are also good at combining 
clues to spot suspicious claims: fraudulent claims are more likely to be made on a Monday than a 
Tuesday, since policyholders who stage accidents tend to assemble friends as false witnesses over 
the weekend. By combining many such rules, it is possible to work out which cards are likeliest 
to have been stolen, and which claims are dodgy.”). 
 50. Data, Data Everywhere, supra note 43 (“Microsoft’s search engine Bing, can advise 
customers whether to buy an airline ticket now or wait for the price to come down by examining 
225 billion flight and price records.”). 
 51. Lohr, supra note 37 (“Online dating services, like Match.com, constantly sift through 
their Web listings of personal characteristics, reactions and communications to improve the 
algorithms for matching men and women on dates.”); John Tierney, Hitting It Off, Thanks to 
Algorithms of Love, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/science/
29tier.html. 
 52. The Data Deluge, supra note 35 (“Mobile-phone operators, meanwhile, analyse 
subscribers’ calling patterns to determine, for example, whether most of their frequent contacts 
are on a rival network. If that rival network is offering an attractive promotion that might cause 
the subscriber to defect, he or she can then be offered an incentive to stay.”). 
 53. See id. (“The oil industry uses supercomputers to trawl seismic data before drilling 
wells.”). 
 54. Data, Data Everywhere, supra note 43 (“Personal-finance websites and banks are 
aggregating their customer data to show up macroeconomic trends, which may develop into 
ancillary businesses in their own right.”). 
 55. See Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution 
or Revolution?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1829 (2008). 
 56. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 18, at 30. 
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2.  Viewing the Law from a New Perspective 
There are many lenses through which to view the law. Justice Holmes 
viewed the law through the eyes of a “bad man.”57 “For many observers 
of the American legal system, law is what judges write in appellate 
opinions.”58 Having entered the age of big data, a growing number of 
scholars are now urging academics and practitioners alike to view the law 
as data. For instance, Professors Daniel Katz59 and Josh Blackman60 
routinely write and speak about the value of aggregating bulk legal data 
and then analyzing it using modern computing. This “law-as-data” 
movement stems from the legal academy’s growing interest in legal 
empiricism, which, until recently, remained largely relegated to the realm 
of political science.61  
To date, the vast majority of empirical studies of the law—or more 
precisely, litigation—have focused on the U.S. Supreme Court.62 This is 
understandable given the High Court’s position at the top of the Judicial 
Branch, its greater visibility compared to lower courts, and its smaller, 
more manageable pool of cases. A handful of scholars have, however, 
stressed the importance of empirically analyzing litigation data generated 
at the district-court level.63  
                                                                                                                     
 57. Holmes, supra note 1, at 459. 
 58. David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 681, 683 (2007). 
 59. See generally Katz, supra note 2, at 910–11 (discussing the significant impact 
innovations like e-discovery will have on the legal market). 
 60. Josh Blackman et al., Fantasy SCOTUS: Crowdsourcing a Prediction Market for the 
Supreme Court, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 125, 165 (2012) (proposing to use “a bot to 
crawl through all of the filings in PACER . . . and develop a comprehensive database of all aspects 
of how each court works”). 
 61. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide (Between Law and 
Political Science), 3 GREEN BAG 2d 267, 268 (2000) (noting law professors’ inabilities to 
contribute to empirical political science scholarship due to lack of training). 
 62. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the 
Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 998 (2012); Theodore W. 
Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1151 (2004); Louis J. 
Sirico Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 135 (1986); David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An 
Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and 
the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 240 (2009); Nicholas 
S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 1073, 1088 (1992). 
 63. See, e.g., Hoffman et al., supra note 58, at 684 (describing the benefits of conducting 
empirical research of district courts using the full case records); Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should 
We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 103 (2009) (“PACER 
offers a significant data source for more accurately capturing and understanding the activity of 
the district courts[ than do published opinions].”); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using 
Court Records for Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation 
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For the purposes of this Article, “litigation data” means: (1) the basic 
information about a given case, such as the names of the parties, 
attorneys, nature of the suit, and other characteristics about the case 
(otherwise referred to as case metadata); (2) information reflected on the 
electronic docket sheet for a given case; and (3) the electronic court 
records associated with a given case.64 When combined, these sources 
paint a detailed portrait of litigation on the front lines of the federal 
Judiciary. When aggregated on a large scale and then filtered using 
software, patterns and trends begin to surface that shed light on how 
parties, attorneys, and judges typically behave during the litigation 
process.65  
Case metadata becomes even more valuable when combined with 
information scraped from case docket sheets and then classified using a 
machine-learning algorithm.66 Docket sheets are ideally suited for 
studying the ebb and flow of litigation because they consist of a 
sequentially ordered timeline of every event that occurs over the life of a 
lawsuit.67 When a lawyer electronically files something or a judge 
communicates in some fashion with the parties, the court clerk will create 
a new docket entry that consists of a brief description of the event, the 
date of that event, and a hyperlink to any documents associated with that 
event.68  
The text passages in docket entries lend themselves to large-scale 
analysis because they are far easier to automatically parse and classify 
with machine-learning algorithms than court records (a key component 
of software-enabled, trend-based lawyering), as the text is typically short 
and formulaic. Docket sheets are also an important source of information 
about district courts because the vast majority of litigation events do not 
                                                                                                                     
Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 163, 168 (2006) (“In short, for anyone who hopes to 
understand litigation—one specific litigation or an entire field of litigation—there is no substitute 
for court records.”). 
 64. This Article limits its analysis to litigation data collected from district courts at the 
federal level, although many of the principles discussed herein apply equally to litigation data at 
the state level.  
 65. See generally Hoffman et al., supra note 58, at 683–85 (describing the benefits of 
conducting empirical research about district courts using the full case records); Schlanger & 
Lieberman, supra note 63, at 168 (underlining the importance of court records to understanding 
litigation). 
 66. For the purposes of this Article, the authors collaborated with an expert in scraping and 
machine learning to develop a proprietary algorithm capable of automatically reading case docket 
sheets, identifying summary judgment events, and classifying the outcome, movants, 
nonmovants, and other metadata that the authors may discuss at greater length in a subsequent 
article. 
 67. See Kim et al., supra note 63, at 107–08. 
 68. Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments 
by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 126. 
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produce written opinions.69 As one commentator has pointed out, “a 
district judge may make many decisions of varying types at different 
points in time in a single case,” as most decisions “are not accompanied 
by written reasons and therefore are recorded on the docket sheet or in a 
brief order as simply a decision to ‘grant’ or ‘deny’ a particular motion.”70 
Decisions that do not produce written opinions, however, can sometimes 
dramatically alter the cost and ultimate outcome of litigation.71 
Readers are probably most familiar with the third and final category 
of litigation data discussed in this Article—court records. Court records 
tell the story of a given case. To initiate a lawsuit in district court, a 
plaintiff must file a complaint72 that sets forth a valid legal basis for relief 
and factual allegations that would, if true, justify such relief.73 A 
defendant will then respond to the complaint by filing an answer,74 
motion to dismiss,75 or any number of other legal instruments.76 After 
reaching a final decision in a given case, a judge may issue an order, 
ruling, or judgment accompanied by a written opinion in which the judge 
will articulate her findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of 
her decision.  
3.  Public Access to Legal Data 
The previous Section answered the “What” question: that is, “What 
type of data may lead to a better understanding of litigation?” Before 
moving on to the “Where” question (as in, “Where can this data be 
found?”), it is important to first take a step back and ask, “Why should 
this data be accessible for empirical analysis?” The answer to this 
question requires a brief journey back in time.  
Since the age of the Pharaohs, men and women have conditioned their 
willingness to submit to the judgment of another on the guarantee that 
such decisions would be carried out in public. Inscribed inside the tomb 
of an Egyptian official who reported to King Tuthmosis III were these 
instructions:  
Lo, whenever an administrator bears cases let there be 
publicity . . . and . . . let water and air report all that he may 
do. Lo, then his conduct is by no means unperceived. If he 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See Kim et al., supra note 63, at 98. 
 70. See id. (discussing opinion bias in empirical studies of district courts). 
 71. Id. at 94, 106–08 (describing the ways in which discovery decisions and nondispositive 
rulings can influence case settlements). 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 74. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
 76. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c), (e). 
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does anything [unseemly] and he is to blame . . . he is not to 
be reinstalled . . . on the authority of an acting official but 
men shall learn of it . . . on the authority of his (proper) 
judge . . . .77 
The strong preference for transparency in U.S. courts traces its roots 
back to Medieval Europe. In the mid-thirteenth century, lawyers began 
keeping records of their appearances before the English court of common 
pleas.78 At the end of their career, lawyers would hand their records down 
to their apprentice, who would then carry on the tradition.79 Lawyers 
quickly realized the value of keeping detailed records of proceedings, 
often citing them to show that their proffered position was consistent with 
the judge’s previous rulings or that the position advanced by their 
adversary was inconsistent with previous rulings.80 This practice 
developed into “the concept of precedent as a means towards achieving 
uniformity and consistency in pleading and in judicial decision-
making.”81  
Lawyers and judges were not the only ones to benefit from the 
accessibility of public records. English peasants used court records to 
prove their entitlement to develop land under the feudal system.82 Before 
long, court records were considered to be a “public resource.”83 The 
importance of transparency was also not lost on the colonists who 
established the first courts in the United States. For example, the 1677 
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey formally recognized 
that “inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend 
the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals [sic] as 
shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor 
in any covert manner.”84 The colonial government of Pennsylvania 
similarly declared, in 1682, that “all courts shall be open.”85 Early settlers 
                                                                                                                     
 77. NORMAN DE GARIS DAVIES, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART EGYPTIAN 
EXPEDITION, THE TOMB OF REKH-MI-RE 86–87 (Ludlow Bull ed., 1944) (footnote omitted) 
(offering possible translations of the hieroglyphics from the tomb of Rekh-mi-Re, Vizier to 
Tuthmosis III, King of Egypt, XVIII Dynasty (1580–1321 B.C.)). 
 78. Anthony Musson, Law and Text: Legal Authority and Judicial Accessibility in the Late 
Middle Ages, in THE USES OF SCRIPT AND PRINT, 1300–1700, at 103 (Julia Crick & Alexandra 
Walsham eds., 2004). 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 104. 
 80. Id. at 103. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 104. 
 83. Id. 
 84. CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY, 1677, reprinted in SOURCES OF 
OUR LIBERTIES 180, 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959). 
 85. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR 
LIBERTIES 209, 217 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959). 
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“sensed from experience and observation that . . . the means used to 
achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of 
both the process and its results.”86 
Today, federal courts carry on the nation’s tradition of transparency 
by preserving the public’s broad, common-law “right to inspect and copy 
public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents.”87 This right of public access to court records applies to both 
civil and criminal actions, and includes both pretrial and trial 
proceedings.88 Some courts have gone a step further by recognizing the 
right to access public records in certain cases as one that is protected by 
the First Amendment.89 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980). 
 87. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Ex parte 
Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 407–08 (1894) (“Such claims of right, and contests over them, are 
not the ordinary incidents of judicial proceeding; and any attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the 
records of the court, would seem to be inconsistent with the common understanding of what 
belongs to a public court of record, to which all persons have the right of access, and to its records, 
according to long established usage and practice.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (protecting 
the public’s right to inspect and copy docket sheets); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 
F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the common law right to public access extends “to 
pretrial documents filed in civil cases, including materials submitted in connection with motions 
for summary judgment”); Smith v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for So. Dist. of Ill., 956 F.2d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“The federal common law right of access to judicial records and documents is well 
recognized.”); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[W]e rule 
that relevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction 
in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the presumption of public 
access applies.”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308–09 (7th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 89. See United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1029 (11th Cir. 2005); Hartford 
Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 93; In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10–13 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz., 156 F.3d 940, 945, 948 (9th Cir. 
1998) (concluding that the First Amendment “requires release of transcripts [of closed criminal 
proceedings] when the competing interests precipitating hearing closure are no longer viable”); 
United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1359–60 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he right of access to voir dire 
examinations encompasses equally the live proceedings and the transcripts which document those 
proceedings. . . . It is access to the content of the proceeding—whether in person, or via some 
form of documentation—that matters.”); Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 
893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The First Amendment presumes that there is a right of access to 
proceedings and documents which have historically been open to the public and where the 
disclosure of which would serve a significant role in the functioning of the process in question.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 505 (1st Cir. 
1989) (finding that “after Richmond Newspapers, a blanket prohibition on the disclosure of 
records of closed criminal cases of the types at issue here implicates the First Amendment”); In 
re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that 
although “[t]he Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether the [F]irst [A]mendment 
right of public access extends to documents,” it was “persuaded that the [F]irst [A]mendment right 
of public access does extend to the documents filed in support of search warrant applications”); 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/7
2015] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF BIG DATA 1357 
 
Courts and scholars alike have identified a variety of benefits that flow 
from public access to court records, including: (1) courts that are more 
accountable to the people;90 (2) courts that are more accountable to 
policymakers;91 (3) increased public respect for and confidence in the 
court system;92 (4) greater consistency in the law’s application;93 (5) 
increased public understanding of how laws are made and applied;94 and 
(6) the “community therapeutic value” of openness that squelches the 
public’s urge to take justice into its own hands.95 
4.  Sources of Litigation Data 
This Subsection discusses various sources of litigation data. It starts 
with an overview of the system utilized to access federal court litigation 
data, and then proceeds to look at alternatives to that system. 
a.  PACER 
Federal litigation data is available electronically to the public through 
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), an online 
repository for court records, docket sheets, and case metadata maintained 
                                                                                                                     
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 5–7 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing First Amendment cases in 
other circuits). But see N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 200–02 (3d Cir. 
2002) (ruling newspapers did not have right of access to civil immigration proceedings); Wilson 
v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1569–70 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the Eleventh 
Circuit had not explicitly joined these constitutional holdings but had recognized a right of access 
to certain fundamental aspects of civil proceedings). 
 90. See Smith, 956 F.2d at 650; Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (noting that public’s right to access 
court records arises from “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public 
agencies”); see also CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 22 (Henry Paolucci trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1963) (1764) (“Let the verdicts and proofs of guilt be made public, so that 
opinion, which is, perhaps, the sole cement of society, may serve to restrain power and passions; 
so that the people may say, we are not slaves, and we are protected—a sentiment which inspires 
courage and which is the equivalent of a tribute to a sovereign who knows his own true interests.”); 
Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age 
of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 307 & n.3 (2004) [hereinafter Winn, Online 
Court Records]. 
 91. Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 495–97 (2009). 
 92. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“Openness thus 
enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to 
public confidence in the system.”). 
 93. LoPucki, supra note 91, at 507–08. 
 94. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980). 
 95. Id. at 570–71; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 
1178 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot 
function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is ‘done in a corner [or] in any 
covert manner.’” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571)); Peter A. Winn, Judicial 
Information Management in an Electronic Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 135, 137 (2009) [hereinafter Winn, Judicial Information Management]. 
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by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.96 Before there was 
PACER, there was paper. At that time, litigation data was practically 
obscure in that it took far more effort and expense to locate, copy, and 
aggregate case files when they were stashed away in filing cabinets 
buried in dimly lit basements of federal courthouses across the country.97 
Not surprisingly, empirical studies of district courts were relatively 
modest in size and few and far between during the infancy of the 
Internet.98 Litigants had little fear that their personal affairs documented 
in court records would leak into the public domain, notwithstanding the 
fact that these documents were technically part of the public record.99 
District courts were also free to manage their dockets with minimal public 
scrutiny.100  
That all changed with the creation of PACER. The Judiciary’s switch 
from paper to electronic case filings made litigation data available to 
anyone with a computer, an internet connection, and a credit card.101 
Practical obscurity suddenly became a relic of the past. As discussed 
below, however, the Judiciary has recreated practical obscurity to a 
degree by erecting PACER’s pay wall, which makes practice-focused 
empirical analysis of bulk litigation data prohibitively costly.  
The federal Judiciary created PACER in 1990, “when an 
appropriations act authorized the federal judiciary to build a system 
furnishing remote access to court records, to be supported by funds 
generated by access fees.”102 The system’s shift from keeping paper 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Michel Ishakian & Ted Willmann, About Us, PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/about.html (last 
visited July 1, 2015). 
 97. Justice John Paul Stevens appears to have coined the U.S. Government’s term “practical 
obscurity,” which he used to refer to the inaccessibility of paper documents due to the 
inconvenience associated with acquiring access to them. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762–64 (1989). See generally Winn, Judicial Information 
Management, supra note 95, at 152 (describing the practical barriers to access associated with 
paper-based “practical obscurity”). 
 98. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil 
Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 116 (1997) (“[W]e have relatively little 
reliable data over time on the civil justice system . . . .”); Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve 
Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185 (1994) (calling for more empirical studies of the civil 
justice system); Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, The Influence of Presidential Versus 
Home State Senatorial Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on the United States District 
Courts, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 657, 661 (2002) (noting the dearth of empirical studies focusing on 
the decision-making process of federal district courts).  
 99. See Winn, Judicial Information Management, supra note 95, at 138; Winn, Online 
Court Records, supra note 90, at 316–17. 
 100. Winn, Judicial Information Management, supra note 95, 168–70. 
 101. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents to Data, 
Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 860–61 (2008). 
 102. Id. at 860. 
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records to electronic records resulted in “an explosion of [the] use” of 
PACER as 20,028 user accounts in 1995 and 39,408 user accounts in 
1999 dramatically increased to 270,000 user accounts by 2003.103  
Recent observers heralded PACER’s creation as “a huge improvement 
over the existing system of paper records,”104 “tremendously ahead of its 
time,”105 and “one of the great success stories of the federal Judiciary.”106 
The enthusiasm with which users initially greeted PACER is not 
surprising considering the old method of inspecting court records, which 
entailed traveling to the courthouse where the desired documents were 
located, thumbing through boxes of dusty files, and photocopying them 
for a fee of fifty cents per page.107 Despite the Judiciary’s quantum leap 
from paper to pixels over two decades ago, PACER is beginning to show 
signs of aging. Critics now complain that the service imposes arbitrarily 
high access fees;108 provides restrictive, inadequate search capabilities;109 
and has an outdated user interface that renders the data largely 
inaccessible.110 
The most common complaint about PACER appears to be directed 
toward the service’s access fees. Rather than subsidizing PACER’s 
creation and maintenance with taxpayer dollars, Congress authorized the 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 861. 
 104. Timothy B. Lee, The Case Against PACER: Tearing Down the Courts’ Paywall, 
ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 9, 2009, 12:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/04/case-
against-pacer/. 
 105. Steve Schultze, PACER, RECAP, and the Movement to Free American Case Law, 
VOXPOPULII (Feb. 3, 2011), http://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/2011/02/03/pacer-recap-and-the-
movement-to-free-american-case-law/. 
 106. A Look at Electronic Public Access in the Federal Courts, THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 2010, 
at 6, 6 (interviewing Judge J. Richard Leonard).  
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1913(4) (Supp. V 1981). 
 108. See, e.g., Greg Beato, Tear Down This Paywall, REASON (May 30, 2012), 
http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/30/tear-down-this-paywall; Timothy B. Lee, Federal Courts 
Jack Up Fees for Online Access by 25 Percent, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 14, 2011, 4:05 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/09/federal-courts-jack-up-fees-for-online-access-by-25-
percent/. 
 109. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 
VILL. L. REV. 973, 987 (2008) (describing how PACER’s search engine restricts users’ ability to 
search for unpublished legal opinions); Martin, supra note 101, at 869 (noting that PACER’s 
search tools and interface “are sufficiently limited that they provide a market for commercial 
database offerings that consist of PACER data and a more sophisticated search engine”); Elizabeth 
Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their 
Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 443 (2012) (describing PACER’s search capabilities as 
“lugubrious”); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 44 (2009) (“The PACER system has come under criticism recently for being difficult to 
use and expensive.”).  
 110. See John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13records.html. 
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Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to charge reasonable user fees 
for access to electronic litigation data.111 Therefore, to access court 
records through PACER, members of the public must register an account 
with the site and provide credit-card information.112 
The service currently charges users ten cents per page to view and 
download PDFs of public court records.113 The service also charges ten 
cents per search, regardless of whether the search results yield relevant 
cases.114 While ten cents per page may seem like a trivial fee to most 
users, it makes compiling a sizeable dataset for empirical analysis 
prohibitively expensive.115 Ten cents per page also seems far less 
reasonable when compared with the cost per printed page. One article 
pointed out that, under PACER’s pricing scheme, “a weekday copy of the 
New York Times would go for $7 or $8, and Walter Isaacson’s biography 
of Steve Jobs would cost $65.60.”116  
One of the most vocal critics of PACER’s pay wall has been Carl 
Malamud, who has earned the reputation as being an “open government 
gadfly” thanks to his aggressive efforts to make digital copies of 
government records available to the public for free.117 According to 
Malamud, “putting the nation’s legal system behind a wall of cash and 
kludge separates the people from . . . the ‘operating system for 
democracy.’”118 So, when the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
and the Government Printing Office announced that they would be 
providing users with free access to PACER records at seventeen libraries 
across the country as part of a pilot program,119 Malamud saw the 
                                                                                                                     
 111. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002) (codified 
in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.). 
 112. PACER Registration, PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/reg_pacer.html (last visited July 
1, 2015). 
 113. PACER, ELECTRONIC PUBLIC ACCESS FEE SCHEDULE (Dec. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf. 
 114. Id. 
 115. To PACER’s credit, users get free access to PACER data as long as their accounts do 
not accrue “charges of more than $15.00 in a quarterly billing cycle.” Id. The service also provides 
free access to judicial opinions, and courts may waive PACER fees for, among other user 
categories, individual researchers affiliated with a particular education institution. Id. That said, 
the steep PACER fees remain prohibitively costly to commercial ventures that might otherwise 
develop new tools around the data to improve the public’s access to litigation information and 
understanding of the courts.  
 116. Beato, supra note 108. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Schwartz, supra note 110. 
 119. Press Release, Federal Depository Library Program, PACER Access (Sept. 26, 2008), 
http://www.fdlp.gov/index2.php?option=com_content&task=emailform&id=229&itemid=22
9 (suspending the pilot program to provide free access to PACER documents at seventeen libraries 
across the United States, “pending an evaluation”). 
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opportunity that he had been waiting for and urged his supporters to 
download as many free court records through the PACER pilot program 
as possible.120 He then asked his supporters to send the records to him so 
that he could make them available to the public for free on his website.121 
Steve Schultze, Princeton University’s Associate Director of 
Information Technology Policy at that time, felt compelled to join 
Malamud’s “PACER liberation front,” as he would later call it, after 
becoming frustrated with the system’s inaccessibility.122 Schultze 
realized, however, that PACER houses hundreds of millions of court 
records and that the number of records that he could manually download 
would amount to nothing more than a drop in the ocean.123 So, instead, 
Schultze created a computer program that could download bulk records 
from PACER and automatically save them to a thumb drive.124 Schultze 
gave the program to a fellow hacker named Aaron Swartz, who then 
proceeded to download around 2.7 million public court records from 
PACER for free from an account created by one of the libraries 
participating in the pilot program.125 
The federal government was not happy when it learned that Swartz 
had downloaded metadata, docket sheets, and court records that 
accounted for roughly twenty percent of the information stored in 
PACER.126 Government officials promptly suspended PACER’s free-
access pilot program, “pending an evaluation.”127 A few weeks later, “a 
Government Printing Office official . . . told librarians that ‘the security 
of the Pacer service was compromised [and the F.B.I. was] conducting an 
investigation’” into the matter.128 Nevertheless, the data that Swartz had 
downloaded from PACER found its way to Malamud’s website, where it 
remains free to download.129 The FBI eventually dropped its 
investigation into Swartz’s mass download,130 perhaps realizing that 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Schwartz, supra note 110. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Schultze, supra note 105.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Schwartz, supra note 110 (reporting that Aaron Swartz, “a 22-year-old Stanford dropout 
and entrepreneur . . . managed to download an estimated 20 percent of the entire database: 
19,856,160 pages of text”).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. See BULK.RESOURCE.ORG, https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/ (last visited July 1, 
2015). 
 130. Aaron Swartz, Wanted by the FBI, AARON SWARTZ’S RAW THOUGHT (Oct. 5, 2009), 
http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/fbifile. 
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Swartz did not break the law by downloading public records from 
PACER and reposting them to the web. 
The recent efforts of Malamud, Schultze, Swartz, and countless other 
open-access advocates have reignited the debate over whether PACER 
should be accessible to the public free of charge. Sensing that this would 
not happen anytime soon, Schultze and a team of Princeton 
undergraduate students created a clever web application called 
“RECAP”—a name derived from “turning PACER around”—that users 
can download and run from within some web browsers when they log 
into PACER.131 For every court record that a user downloads from 
PACER, the program saves a duplicate copy to its own database, which 
it then makes available to the public for free.132 In return, RECAP alerts 
users when they come across court records in PACER that are available 
for free in RECAP’s database, thereby saving the user the expense of 
having to download the document from PACER.133 Since creating the 
program, Schultze estimates that RECAP has freed millions of records 
previously trapped behind PACER’s pay wall.134 As a result, startups are 
now able to develop and tinker with new web applications that let lawyers 
leverage PACER’s litigation data on a large scale at little to no cost.  
b.  PACER Alternatives 
No single company has had a more profound impact on disseminating 
the rule of law than West Publishing Company. Established in 1872 by 
two brothers, John and Horatio West,135 the company now dominates the 
market for legal information. Over the last few decades, the publisher’s 
model for distributing legal information has changed dramatically due to 
technological innovations. In 1973, Lexis shook up West Publishing 
Company’s comfortable monopoly in the legal-publishing space by 
introducing the world’s first database of electronic legal texts—
LexisNexis.136 Two years later, West introduced its own electronic case 
database—Westlaw—beginning the race to digitize the law.137 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Turning PACER Around, RECAP L. (Aug. 14, 2009), https://www.recapthelaw.org/
2009/08/14/welcome/. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Josh Blackman, JoshLive: Interview with Steve Schultze About PACER, RECAP, and 
Access to Justice, YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lX28yd6ks3U 
(statement beginning at 17:07). 
 135. Company History: Historical Highlights from Across Thomson Reuters, 
THOMSONREUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/en/about-us/company-history.html (last visited 
July 1, 2015). 
 136. Erin Carlyle, Westlaw Rises to Legal Publishing Fame by Selling Free Information, 
CITY PAGES (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.citypages.com/2009-04-29/news/westlaw-rises-to-legal-
publishing-fame-by-selling-free-information/full/. 
 137. Id. 
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The next major paradigm shift in legal publishing occurred with the 
widespread adoption of web browsers that provided lawyers with instant, 
remote access to a wealth of electronic legal information that previously 
required a trip to the courthouse. Westlaw and Lexis quickly moved their 
respective digital content to the web and began charging law firms 
considerable subscription fees for access.138 Rather than developing 
sophisticated natural-language search algorithms to help lawyers more 
effectively identify relevant sources, Westlaw simply applied its print-
based topical index, called “KeyCites,” to its web-based legal content, 
which has since grown into a hyperlinked matrix of more than 100,000 
topics and subtopics.139 Even today, it is clear that Westlaw still views 
itself as a traditional publishing company, not a technology company. 
Rather than developing and refining machine-learning algorithms 
capable of automatically indexing new cases with a high degree of 
accuracy as they are added to its databases, Westlaw still employs an 
army of less efficient and more costly legal experts to manually sift 
through, summarize, and classify each source before making it available 
online.140 
Having fattened on the fruits of their duopoly over the last couple of 
decades, Westlaw and Lexis’s failure to innovate is hardly surprising.141 
Rather than investing in new features and competing on the basis of 
technology, the two companies have, in the past, simply used their deep 
cash reserves to acquire promising startups that might one day pose a 
competitive threat.142  
                                                                                                                     
 138. West Group History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/west-group-history/ (last visited July 1, 2015); About LexisNexis: Historical Milestones, 
LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/about-us.page (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 139. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Case for Curation: The Relevance of Digest and Citator 
Results in Westlaw and Lexis, 32 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. QUARTERLY 13, 14, 18–19 (2013). 
 140. See id. at 18–19.  
 141. See David Hall, Google, Westlaw, LexisNexis and Open Access: How the Demand for 
Free Legal Research Will Change the Legal Profession, 26 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 53, 
56 (2012) (“West and Lexis have struggled to keep up with the times and have been slow to react 
to customers’ evolving expectations with electronic research. A large part of their reluctance to 
change was due to their position as a firmly entrenched duopoly.”). 
 142. See generally KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER’S GUIDE AND 
REFERENCE MANUAL 8–15 (2005) (“In the last twenty years of the 20th century, the world of legal 
publishing has been dramatically altered as a consequence of corporate acquisitions and mergers. 
While small legal publishers continue to enter the fray, many leading legal publishing houses have 
been acquired by major international conglomerates.”). Between 1980 and 2005, Thomson 
Corporation had acquired over a dozen competitors in the legal-information space: 
Over the course of about twenty-five years, the Thomson Corporation, of 
Canada, acquired Callaghan and Company, Clark Boardman, Warren, Gorham 
& Lamont, Lawyers Cooperative, Bancroft-Whitney, Research Institute of 
America, Practitioners Publishing, Counterpoint Publishing, Gale Research, 
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But a new breed of legal-technology startups are emerging that offer 
a promising glimpse into the future of legal research. It is a future where 
web applications allow attorneys to not only search for and sift through 
legal authority, but also to learn about the tactics of their opposing 
counsel, the tendencies of their judge, and other behavioral aspects of 
litigation that tend to influence the outcome and cost of litigation ahead 
of time. In fact, lawyers in certain practice areas have already begun to 
make important strategic decisions based on trends and patterns in 
litigation data revealed through their use of these services.  
Leading the way in the emerging renaissance in legal research is a 
web-startup named Lex Machina, which is Latin for “law machine.”143 
Lex Machina144 was founded in 2006 as an interdisciplinary project 
between the Stanford Law School and Stanford University’s computer 
science department to bring transparency to intellectual-property 
litigation.145 Today, attorneys handling bet-the-company patent litigation 
use Lex Machina’s web-based analytics service to uncover trends and 
patterns in historical patent litigation to more accurately forecast costs 
and more effectively evaluate various case strategies.146  
The service scrapes PACER for new cases involving intellectual 
property on a nightly basis.147 Whereas Westlaw manually assigns 
KeyCites to the legal opinions stored within its databases,148 Lex 
Machina uses a combination of human reviewers and a proprietary 
                                                                                                                     
Information Access, Barclays Law Publishers, Carswell (of Canada), the West 
Publishing Company, Federal Publications, Inc., Findlaw, one the Internet’s 
leading legal index and information sites, and the Harrison Company. West itself 
had already acquired Banks-Baldwin to go with its earlier purchases of 
Foundation Press, the American Law Book Company, the Edward Thompson 
Company, and Boston Law Book, among others. 
Id.  
 143. Phillip J. Bond, Guest Column: ‘Law Machine’ Puts Patent Files at Congress’s 
Fingertips, THE HILL (Dec. 23, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/193866-
guest-column-law-machine-puts-patent-files-at-congresss. 
 144. Lex Machina was formerly referred to as the “Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation 
Clearinghouse.” An Empirical Study of Certain Settlement- Related Motions for Vacatur in Patent 
Cases, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/an-empirical-study-of-certain-settlement-related-
motions-for-vacatur-in-patent-cases/ (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 145. Stanford Law School Spins off New Venture, Offering Commercial Access to Intellectual 
Property Legal Data, STAN. L. SCH. (Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.law.stanford.edu/news/pr/stanford-law-
school-spins-off-new-venture-offering-commercial-access-to-intellectual-property-legal-data; Bond, 
supra note 143. 
 146. See What We Do, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/ (last visited July 
1, 2015). 
 147. Tam Harbert, Supercharging Patent Lawyers with AI, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 30, 2013, 
9:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/geek-life/profiles/supercharging-patent-lawyers-with-ai. 
 148. Mart, supra note 139, at 18–19. 
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algorithm that automatically parses and classifies the outcome for each 
case that the service extracts from PACER.149 After extracting, 
processing, and scrubbing the data, Lex Machina assembles and presents 
aggregated case data for a particular judge, party, attorney, or law firm 
with analytics that allow users to quickly discern trends and patterns in 
the data that may affect the cost or outcome of their case.150  
A number of other recent startups have similarly pledged to build 
applications that provide attorneys with “a new view on legal 
research.”151 Ravel Law, for example, is a search engine for legal 
opinions that displays the citation network for a given legal concept.152 
While Westlaw and Lexis stack search results in a column, often burying 
important case pages back in search results,153 Ravel Law visually 
represents the most important case on a particular topic as a hub, with 
numerous spokes pointing to subsequent cases that have cited it.154 The 
size of the hub reflects the relative number of cases that cite it.155 The 
frequency with which courts cite a particular case often signals that case’s 
influence over a given area of law or relevance to a particular legal 
concept.156 Until Ravel Law’s launch in 2012,157 lawyers using Westlaw 
could not glean such insights into the federal Judiciary’s citation 
networks without manually plotting each case citation by hand. Whereas 
manual plotting would have taken days and perhaps even weeks, Ravel 
Law presents its results in a matter of seconds.  
Another noteworthy startup is Judicata, which is attempting to 
develop a Google-like search engine for finding relevant legal 
authority.158 The ambitious startup will attempt to compete directly with 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Harbert, supra note 147. 
 150. See How It Works, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/how-it-works/ 
(last visited July 1, 2015). 
 151. See Simon Fodden, Legal Upstarts, SLAW (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.slaw.ca/
2013/10/08/legal-upstarts/.  
 152. Nicole Cudiamat Minnis, The New Competition—Emerging Legal Technologies out of 
Silicon Valley, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-
competition-emerging-legal-technologies-out-silicon-valley-0; J.B. Ruhl, Deep Structure—The 
Next Generation of Empirical Legal Studies, LAW 2050 (Mar. 15, 2013), http://law2050.com/
2013/03/15/deep-structure-the-next-generation-of-empirical-legal-studies/; see also About Us, 
RAVEL LAW, https://www.ravellaw.com/about (last visited July 1, 2015).  
 153. See Ruhl, supra note 152. 
 154. Robert Ambrogi, Visual Law Services Are Worth a Thousand Words—And Big Money, 
A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
visual_law_services_are_worth_a_thousand_words--and_big_money. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id.; Ruhl, supra note 152. 
 157. About Us, supra note 152. 
 158. See Blake Masters, Judicata: The Path of the Law, BLAKE MASTERS (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://blakemasters.com/post/37718729412/judicata-raises-2m. 
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Lexis and Westlaw by offering a more refined search experience that 
utilizes “highly specialized case law parsing and algorithmically assisted 
human review to turn unstructured court opinions into structured data.”159 
The company’s goal is to then “leverage that data to build legal research 
and analytics tools that are an order of magnitude better than existing 
offerings.”160  
The sudden explosion of technology startups focused on utilizing data 
to improve the delivery and consumption of legal services is remarkable 
for several reasons. First, for decades, the legal profession experienced 
very little technological disruption. While new technologies like fax, 
computers, electronic databases, and mobile devices enabled lawyers to 
become more efficient, they did not help them to become more effective. 
Therefore, and moreover because these developments were incremental 
and intermittent, they went virtually unnoticed by the profession. 
Christina Farr of Venture Beat noted that “[f]or all the talk of innovation 
in Silicon Valley,” law has been the “one industry that has remained 
largely untouched by technology.”161 
But things are starting to change as data continues to play an 
increasingly important role in the decision-making process for lawyers 
and their clients. After returning from a legal-technology conference held 
in early 2014, Robert Ambrogi—a Massachusetts lawyer who “has been 
writing about legal technology for more than two decades”—wrote that 
he was “convinced that [he had] never before seen a time of such intense 
and creative innovation in legal technology.”162  
The proliferation of legal-technology startups today is also remarkable 
because of the sudden spike in investment activity that has made it 
possible. For years, investors perceived the legal-technology startup 
market as one of the most unattractive markets in which to invest.163 In 
fact, in 2012, TechCrunch categorized startups based on their target 
market and ranked them based on the amount of capital that each category 
of startups had raised in recent years.164 TechCrunch reported that legal 
startups were “in last place” in terms of new-venture fundraising, raising 
                                                                                                                     
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Christina Farr, Meet the Startups That Are Giving Everyone Affordable Access to 
Justice, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 20, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/03/20/legal-
startups/. 
 162. Robert Ambrogi, Time of Unprecedented Innovation in Legal Technology, LAWSITES 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2014/02/time-unprecedented-innovation-legal-
technology.html. 
 163. See e.g., Sameer Al-Sakran, Getting Rich by the Numbers, A CrunchBased How-To, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/07/21/getting-rich-by-the-numbers-a-
crunchbased-how-to/. 
 164. Id. 
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a mere $104 million in startup funding.165 In stark contrast to the dismal 
investment figures published by TechCrunch, Thomson Reuters more 
recently reported that an “estimated $458 million . . . has been invested 
in legal startups in recent years . . . with an average valuation of $4.3 
million” per startup.166  
The list of investors who are now pouring money into legal-
technology startups reads like a Who’s Who of notable technology 
investors. Lex Machina, for example, has already raised a reported $6.8 
million in funding167 from a pool of investors that includes, among others: 
 
 Jerry Yang, founder of Yahoo! and founding partner of 
AME Cloud Ventures;  
 Naval Ravikant, cofounder of AngelList; 
 Jeff Hammerbacher, founder and chief scientist at 
Cloudera;  
 Joe Lonsdale, founder of Palantir Technologies and 
Addepar and founding partner of Formation 8; 
 Radhika Shah, founder and CEO of SocialVilla; 
 Eugene Zhang, founder and president of Innospring; 
 Costanoa Venture Capital;  
 Cue Ball Capital;  
 Stanford University;  
 Weiying Ding, partner at TEEC Angel Fund; 
 Clint Korver, partner at Ulu Ventures;  
 Lenny Mendonca, director of McKinsey & Company; 
 Bill Tobin, partner at Strayer Consulting Group; 
 Chris Byrne, vice president of intellectual property 
strategy at Samsung Innovation;  
 David Chao, cofounder and general partner at DCM;  
 Richard Chen, trustee of the U.C. Berkeley Foundation;  
 Dan Cooperman, of counsel at DLA Piper;  
 Eric Goldman, law professor at Santa Clara University 
School of Law;  
 Mark Haynes, partner at Haynes Beffel & Wolfeld;  
 Shane Johnson, managing director of PaintBrush Capital 
Partners;  
 Brad Jones, partner at Redpoint Ventures; and 
 Jean Kovacs, president of the Northern California 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Id. 
 166. David Curle, Startups: $458 Million in Legal Services R&D, LEGAL CURRENT (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://legalexecutiveinsights.com/startups-438-million-in-legal-services-rd/. 
 167. Lex Machina, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/lex-machina (last visited July 1, 2015). 
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Harvard Business School Alumni Angels.168 
Since 2012, Judicata has raised nearly $8 million in venture funding 
from a host of big-name investors, including: 
 Peter Thiel, cofounder of PayPal, billionaire investor at 
Founders Fund and Clarion Capital, and former attorney; 
 Keith Rabois, partner at Khosla Ventures and former 
attorney; 
 David Lee, managing member at SV Angel; and 
 David Perla, managing director at 1991 Ventures.169  
II.  BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF BIG DATA 
This Part discusses the nature of legal “predictions” that big data will 
enable and attempts to define the value and limitations of such data-
driven predictions. The Part also contains the crux of this Article’s 
argument: that big data significantly enhances Coasean bargaining by 
lowering information costs, which traditionally formed the most easily 
identifiable transaction costs for purposes of Coasean analysis of legal 
transactions and disputes. 
A.  Understanding the Lawyer–Machine Symbiosis 
To appreciate the power and limitations of software as a tool for 
gleaning insights from aggregated legal data, it is helpful to consider the 
application of data-crunching software to another domain: chess.170 For 
centuries, chess was a game of human intellect—a yardstick for 
measuring the human mind. People used words like “genius”171 and 
“prodigy”172 to describe those who had demonstrated mastery of the 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Board, Investors & Advisors, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/about/board-
investors/ (last visited July 1, 2015); Lex Machina, supra note 167. Note that some of the 
individuals in this list invested in Lex Machina on behalf of a principal while others invested in 
their personal capacities. This Article includes the institutional affiliations of some of the investors 
who fall into the latter category solely as a point of reference.  
 169. Judicata, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/judicata (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 170. A portion of this Section expands upon the ideas presented in a lecture given by the 
cofounder of Palantir Technologies at Stanford University. During this lecture, the cofounder 
traced the roots of modern-day predictive analytics to early computer programs capable of beating 
humans at chess. See generally Stephen Cohen, The Path to Palantir, ECORNER (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://ecorner.stanford.edu/authorMaterialInfo.html?mid=3052. 
 171. See, e.g., Jay Boyar, Convincing Story of Chess Genius, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 17, 
1995), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1995-09-17/entertainment/9509110220_1_bobby-fischer-
josh-waitzkin-steven-zaillian. 
 172. See, e.g., Dean Chang, Shining Knight of Chess? One-Time Prodigy Checks out Future, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 24, 1995), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/shining-knight-
chess-one-time-prodigy-check. 
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game. As computers became increasingly powerful, chess players began 
to ask whether a computer could out-maneuver a human opponent in a 
chess match. In 1997, computer scientists at I.B.M. accepted the 
challenge by “teaching” a computer, dubbed “Deep Blue,” to play 
chess.173 The scientists trained Deep Blue by feeding it loads of data from 
previous matches played by chess grandmasters.174 When Deep Blue 
faced off against chess Grandmaster Garry Kasparov later that year, the 
computer seemed to predict the his every move,175 beating him in what 
marked the first time in history that the world’s best chess player had lost 
to a computer under tournament conditions.176 
As computers became increasingly powerful over the following years, 
the question of whether computers could outperform humans in 
processing information became rather mundane. Instead, people began to 
wonder whether the combination of humans and computers working 
together could outperform a super computer working alone. In 2005, 
Playchess.com, an online chess website, tested this theory by hosting a 
“freestyle chess tournament” in which players of varying skill levels 
formed teams that could use any resource at their disposal, including 
computers running chess software.177 To the shock and amazement of the 
chess world, two amateur chess players from New Hampshire, using off-
the-shelf computers and chess software, won the tournament, handily 
defeating some of the world’s best chess players who were equipped with 
the world’s most powerful chess software.178 
So what set them apart from the best players in the world equipped 
with the most powerful chess software in world? As Garry Kasparov 
would later explain, “[t]heir skill at manipulating and ‘coaching’ their 
computers to look very deeply into positions effectively counteracted the 
superior chess understanding of their grandmaster opponents and the 
greater computational power of other participants.”179 In other words, the 
average players were able to leverage their computers to a much greater 
degree than their higher-ranking opponents because they were keenly 
aware of the limitations of relying on their own personal experience and 
intuition, yet they also recognized the human component that is so vital 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Garry Kasparov, The Chess Master and the Computer, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 11, 
2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/feb/11/the-chess-master-and-the-computer/. 
 174. Referring to Kasparov’s 1997 match against Deep Blue, IBM’s website boasts that 
“Kasparov isn’t playing a computer, he’s playing the ghosts of grandmasters past.” Frequently 
Asked Questions: Deep Blue, IBM, https://www.research.ibm.com/deepblue/meet/html/d.3.3a.shtml 
(last visited July 1, 2015). 
 175. See Kasparov, supra note 173.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Dark Horse ZackS Wins Freestyle Chess Tournament, CHESS NEWS (June 19, 2005), 
http://en.chessbase.com/post/dark-horse-zacks-wins-freestyle-che-tournament. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Kasparov, supra note 173. 
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to leveraging the computational strength of computers when making 
decisions.180 
While this insight may have seemed novel and profound to the world 
of chess at the time, decades earlier Professor J. C. R. Licklider had 
described the working relationship between humans and computers that 
explains the chess amateurs’ success:  
In the anticipated symbiotic partnership, men will set the 
goals, formulate the hypotheses, determine the criteria, and 
perform the evaluations. Computing machines will do the 
routinizable work that must be done to prepare the way for 
insights and decisions in technical and scientific thinking. 
Preliminary analyses indicate that the symbiotic partnership 
will perform intellectual operations much more effectively 
than man alone can perform them.181 
What is remarkable about Professor Licklider’s article is that, despite 
the dramatic changes in technology since its publication, the 
administrative tasks that waste valuable time and Licklider’s vision for 
how computers might eliminate such waste remain just as prescient 
today. Licklider offered the following description of his typical workday 
in trying to solve a complex problem: 
About 85 per cent of my “thinking” time was spent getting 
into a position to think, to make a decision, to learn 
something I needed to know. Much more time went into 
finding or obtaining information than into digesting it. Hours 
went into the plotting of graphs, and other hours into 
instructing an assistant how to plot. When the graphs were 
finished, the relations were obvious at once, but the plotting 
had to be done in order to make them so.182 
Most lawyers have probably experienced similar frustrations when 
trying to discern winning arguments from losing arguments by reading 
dozens of opinions over the course of several days or even weeks at their 
client’s expense. Even more lawyers likely do not even bother to do this, 
opting to go with their gut instead. Consider, for example, a hypothetical 
attorney who is considering whether filing a motion to dismiss early in 
litigation would be a prudent decision. Before an informed prediction 
about the likely cost or result of such a motion can be made, the attorney 
must perform a number of mechanical tasks better left to a computer. 
Such tasks might include searching Westlaw for similar cases, noting the 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See Ari Gesher, Friction in Human-Computer Symbiosis: Kasparov on Chess, 
PALANTIR BLOG (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.palantir.com/2010/03/friction-in-human-computer-
symbiosis-kasparov-on-chess/. 
 181. J. C. R. Licklider, ManComputer Symbiosis, HFE-1 IRE TRANSACTIONS ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN ELECTRONICS 4, 4 (1960). 
 182. Id. at 6. 
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arguments made in each case, and then plotting the outcomes of each case 
to determine the likelihood that the presiding judge will grant their 
motion to dismiss, which could take hours or even days to accomplish. 
Only then will the attorney be in a position to make a well-informed 
prediction about the likelihood of success, forecast the fees and costs 
associated with preparing such a motion, and communicate these 
considerations to their client. At this point, the attorney will have already 
exhausted a considerable amount of resources, raising the stakes of the 
decision.  
Unfortunately, as the above hypothetical illustrates, it currently takes 
far too long to search for and compile the information needed to make an 
informed prediction about the best course of action. Services like Lex 
Machina present a solution to this problem by relying on lawyers, judges, 
and scholars to do what they do best—coming up with hypotheses (for 
example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has 
the highest patentee “win rate”)183—while letting computers do what they 
do best—testing these hypotheses against a large collection of historical 
data (for example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
has the highest patentee win rate (40.3%) while the Eastern District of 
Virginia’s patentee “win rate” is lower (30.4%), but still higher than the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin (24.0%)).184 
Note that, in the lawyer–computer symbiosis illustrated in this example, 
it is the attorney, not the computer, who must apply her domain expertise 
to determine which questions are important to her client’s case, which 
data might contain answers to such questions, and which outcomes are 
favored. 
B.  How Big (Legal) Data Changes the Game 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this Article proposes that big data 
differs qualitatively from the technological changes of the last few 
decades. Word processors, photocopiers, billing software, email, and 
online case databases mostly streamlined tasks that lawyers were already 
doing. Lawyers were sending notes and letters before email, making 
carbon copies before Xerox, and drafting legal documents long before 
WordPerfect. A few tasks gave way to complete automation, but most 
merely became more efficient, more replicable, and used less space.  
Despite this electronic streamlining, the approach to lawyering was 
much the same. Legal rules dominated the approach to practice. Legal 
advice would center on the rules—case law, statutes, and regulations—
and their mandated outcomes. Legal analysis meant applying the law to 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Robert Angle, Eastern District of Virginia—A Top Venue for Patentee Plaintiffs (?), 
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the facts and making comparisons, distinctions, analogies, and normative 
arguments. Legal predictions were assessments of the probability that a 
client’s situation—his set of facts—would trigger a particular legal rule, 
thereby compelling a given outcome. Legal advice instructed clients how 
to work within or around the rules. Where the rules conferred broad 
discretion on judges or regulators, lawyers had to cope with uncertainty. 
Most cases settle before trial, and most transactions do not result in 
litigation.185 Even so, negotiations and bargaining, whether over 
contracts, plea bargains, or lawsuit settlements, have traditionally taken 
place in the shadow of the trial, as most cases are resolved in the lead up 
to trial based on the parties’ and lawyers’ expected outcome at trial, 
discounted by the money that they expect to save by not having to proceed 
to trial.186 The technologies that lawyers historically embrace still 
function within this paradigm. Online case research, conference calls, 
drafting documents on laptops, and scheduling with smartphones all still 
take place in the shadow of the trial. 
Big data moves lawyers away from the shadow of the trial and into 
the shadow of data. Software designed to surface trends and patterns in 
legal data as described above provide attorneys with powerful tools for 
gleaning relevant, practical insights into dynamics that affect litigation 
beyond the black-letter law. A judge’s tendency to grant or deny certain 
motions may tell the lawyer more about his next decision than the 
statutory verbiage governing the circumstances.187 Similarly, which 
judges or jurisdictions, if any, moved dockets along quickly, 
micromanaged settlements or discovery, or loved or eschewed special 
masters—over the last year or last decade—is data that lawyers can now 
obtain and consider. Big data yields clear behavioral profiles, charted 
across time, of opposing parties, opposing counsel, judges in an alternate 
forum, and so on. Discretionary rulings shed their uncertainty and 
become a matter of pattern matching and predictions. Big data changes 
                                                                                                                     
 185. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1984). 
 186. See HARRY KALVEN JR. ET AL., THE AMERICAN JURY 31–32 (1966); Thomas W. Church 
Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 509, 512–14, 523 (1979); Robert Cooter 
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 187. See Charles J. Snyder, Moneyball Lawyering, 65 ARK. L. REV. 837, 862 (2012). 
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the traditional approach to lawyering because it adds a large dimension 
besides the legal rules to legal decision-making. Of course, the computer 
will not tell the lawyer what to do, but it completely changes the context 
for making strategic decisions.  
When lawyers refer to relying on their “instinct” or “experience,” the 
legal profession assumes that they are not talking about the legal rules. 
These lawyers are not claiming that they trust hunches about statutes or 
case precedents that they could simply look up, but rather their hunches 
about the leanings of a particular judge or jury, the resolve of the 
opposing party or lawyer, or the salesmanship of a witness. Such 
intuitions are experience-based inferences about the tendencies of certain 
individuals to behave in certain ways drawn from the lawyer’s personal 
observations or discussions with her colleagues. In other words, in 
addition to looking up legal rules to ascertain the mandated disposition of 
an issue, lawyers also engage in unscientific profiling of the other 
characters involved in a matter. Therein lies the main value, both to the 
client and to prospective lateral-hire employers, of legal experience—the 
rather intangible knowledge about how things work and how key players 
in a legal matter behave. 
Up to now, technological advances in law practice had almost nothing 
to do with this component of lawyering—the lawyer’s experience-based 
inferences, hunches, or predictions. Instead, rolodexes moved to 
databases, bookkeeping moved to spreadsheets, meetings moved to 
conference calls, and so on. Certain manual tasks gave way to 
automation. The software enabling lawyers to make decisions based on 
data differs from previous technological advances in that it directly 
relates to experience-based inferences, except now, a lawyer can glean 
insights in minutes when this skill previously would have taken years of 
observations and personal interactions to acquire. 
C.  Coasean Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data 
A feature of big data largely ignored in the legal and social science 
literature up to now is its potential to affect bargaining and negotiations 
by lowering information costs and information asymmetries. Nearly 
everything written about big (legal) data has been in either marketing 
material188 or policy literature discussing privacy concerns.189  
                                                                                                                     
 188. See, e.g., Owen Byrd, Moneyball for Lawyers: How Data and Analytics Are 
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Analyzed under a Coasean point of view,190 lower transaction costs 
increase the chance of bargaining while “mak[ing] legal rules in the 
surrounding environment less important for the eventual outcome.”191 
Information costs and asymmetries are primary transaction costs for all 
forms of lawyering outside the courtroom192—contract negotiation and 
drafting, settlement talks, plea-bargaining, and the full range of 
transactional work.193 Lower transaction costs make negotiating under, or 
around, the legal rules easier.194 The Coase Theorem suggests195 that 
“bargains are more likely to occur when transaction costs are low,”196 and 
                                                                                                                     
Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2013) (“[O]bscurity is a critical component of online privacy.”); Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology 
and Data Mining, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 389, 391 (2004) (discussing “whether the Fourth 
Amendment constrains government data mining in any meaningful way”); Peter A. Winn, 
Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 135, 136, 141 (2009) (discussing “the changes which have come about with the 
introduction of electronic information systems and the death of practical obscurity”).  
 190. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). R.H. Coase’s 
groundbreaking article, The Problem of Social Cost, helped launch the law and economics 
movement among legal scholars. Citations to Coase’s work have become ubiquitous in academic 
scholarship. See generally Daniel Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History 
of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397 (1997) (providing an excellent overview of literature 
based on the Coase Theorem).  
 191. Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1132 & nn.9–10 
[hereinafter Stevenson, Costs of Codification]. “The Coase Theorem posits roughly that legal 
rules or rights matter least where parties have the most opportunity to negotiate; conversely, rules 
and rights matter more when parties have less opportunity to bargain around the laws.” Id. at 1132 
n.10. This is Professor Stevenson’s paraphrasing; Coase’s argument was not simplified down into 
one sentence in his original article. Id. Coase attributed the “Coase Theorem” moniker to 
economist Joseph Stigler. See R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157 (1988) 
[hereinafter COASE, THE FIRM]. 
 192. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1150 n.29 (2005) (“Transaction costs, 
broadly defined, sometimes purchase real benefits. Some types of transaction costs—such as the 
costs of negotiating contracts, which involve obtaining information about the value of the thing 
being contracted for—allow prospective purchasers to evaluate whether the transaction should 
proceed.”). 
 193. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225, 
1242 (1994) (“Transaction costs involved in making contracts include costs of collecting 
information, negotiating, and drafting.”). 
 194. Coase, supra note 190, at 15 (“It is always possible to modify by transactions on the 
market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are 
costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in 
the value of production.”).  
 195. “Coase’s article is widely considered to be the most-cited article of all time in legal 
scholarship.” Stevenson, Costs of Codification, supra note 191, at 1150 n.127. 
 196. Id. at 1150. But transaction costs do not actually have to be low. A purely rational actor 
will invest $99.99 to get $100 from the government. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transactional Costs 
and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional 
Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 478–79, 511 (1988). Yet this transaction is not necessarily efficient. 
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numerous scholars have identified information costs as a primary 
category of transaction costs overall.197 Big data lowers information costs 
and information asymmetries between parties; bargains are therefore 
more likely to occur as they become easier to initiate and consummate. 
For example, in the context of litigation and settlement negotiations, 
parties are far more likely to reach an agreement to settle before trial—
thereby saving both sides the costs and anxiety of litigation—if each side 
has better information about their opponent.198 This would include 
information about the opposing party and their litigation history, as well 
as opposing counsel and his track record and patterns of decision-making, 
all of which are now available through big data. Particularly important 
would be information about previous settlement agreements—whether 
involving the opposing party, their counsel, or a related nexus or cause of 
litigation—and this information is unavailable through the conventional 
Westlaw and Lexis services. Professor Ben Depoorter has recently argued 
that information about previous settlements is supremely important for 
those trying to settle a new case before trial,199 and the data-analytic firms 
provide invaluable information in this regard.200 Even post-verdict 
settlement negotiations, which seem to occur more frequently than 
previously thought,201 depend on information and are, in turn, a valuable 
source of information for future litigants.202 Settlement negotiations are a 
classic case of Coasean bargaining,203 and big data facilitates such 
negotiations by providing both parties with better information. Not only 
do the parties have less uncertainty to interfere with agreements, but also 
                                                                                                                     
Rather it represents a “deadweight cost” since that $99.99 could have been spent to generate 
wealth and instead was spent to transfer wealth. Id. at 478–79.  
 197. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1659 n.56 
(2011) (“‘Coasean bargaining’—frictionless negotiation with zero transaction costs—assumes not 
only the absence of bargaining costs but also perfect information.”); Robert C. Ellickson, The 
Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 619–20 (1989) (describing 
information costs as fatal to Coasean bargaining even where other transaction costs are minimal); 
Cynthia Estlund, Just The Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 
369–70 (2011); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 65–67 (1992) 
(discussing the role of information as a transaction cost that impedes Coasean Bargaining).  
 198. Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 42–43, 62 
(1995); see also Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 824 & n.30 
(2013); Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93, 102–
03 (1992). 
 199. Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil 
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 974 (2010). 
 200. See, e.g., Ambrogi, supra note 154. 
 201. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1370–71 (2010). 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Kelly, supra note 197, at 1695, 1720. 
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their positions are likely to move closer together as each side has a more 
realistic picture of the case and its likely outcome, leaving less 
disagreement to keep them apart.204 Lawyering with big data means that 
cases are more likely to settle overall and that parties should reach 
agreements more quickly.205  
Of course, an increase in settlement rates due to Coasean bargaining 
can present downsides as well. To the extent that settlement lowers the 
expected total cost of litigation, marginal plaintiffs (especially those with 
smaller claims) are more likely to bring suit—settlements greatly 
decrease the number of trials but may also increase the number of claims 
brought. Thus, the Coasean bargaining benefits of big data, in the context 
of litigation settlements, will have a partial offset as marginal plaintiffs 
are more likely than before to initiate new lawsuits. 
Litigation is not the only arena for Coasean bargaining. Property 
transactions also depend on low bargaining costs, and information costs 
have historically been prevalent transaction costs for agreements to 
transfer real estate206 or intellectual property.207 Coasean bargaining 
occurs regularly between city planners and developers,208 and the 
information now available through big data can significantly facilitate 
such bargaining—again by reducing information costs for both sides. 
Energy trading is a growing area of transactional work, and information 
costs have traditionally been a barrier to Coasean bargaining in this 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 493, 495 (1996) (explaining that cases are less likely to settle and more likely to go to trial 
when the parties disagree on the likely outcome). 
 205. See David G. Anderson, Effective Construction Claim Resolution: Understanding 
DCAA, 43 PUB. CONT. L.J. 165, 196 (2014) (discussing “the information needed to settle a claim 
quickly without discovery or trial”); Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical 
Malpractice Litigation as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 77 (2011) (“Regulators can act 
more quickly and effectively with full information on the number of lawsuits, the settlements, and 
information revealed in pretrial discovery.”); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class 
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (2003) (“Settlement values can also 
change quickly in response to new information.”). 
 206. See Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 254 (2014) (applying 
Coasean bargaining principles to property transactions between states); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property Rights, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1927, 
1945–46 (2012) (discussing signage and fencing as signaling devices in the context of Coasean 
bargaining between potential buyers and sellers of real estate). 
 207. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: 
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (discussing Coasean bargaining and intellectual 
property transactions); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration 
and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 456 (2009) (applying Coasean bargaining 
principles to “contracting for innovation”). 
 208. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1682 (2012) (discussing 
Coasean bargaining between city planners and developers). 
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setting as well;209 big data should lower these costs and streamline such 
transactions. Any transaction complex enough to require lawyers to 
consummate the deal becomes easier in the shadow of big data—
valuations become more accurate and harmonized between parties, and 
prospective buyers and sellers can retain the benefits of arms-length 
transactions while gaining the assurance of information that previously 
came only through familiarity.  
A more subtle effect of big data on lawyering, from a Coasean 
perspective, is that legal rules or procedures governing the situation have 
less import—a corollary of the Coase Theorem.210 As big data facilitates 
bargaining by lowering information costs and asymmetries, a side effect 
is the dilution of various legal rules surrounding the subject of 
negotiation. Transaction costs—the things that prevent automatic 
agreement among parties—“are what animate the legal rules, or give 
them their verve.”211 The Coase Theorem implies that ex ante legal rules 
and entitlements are less significant when parties can easily transact 
around them.212  
In the real world, Coase emphasized that transaction costs vary greatly 
but are never zero.213 The import of the relevant legal rules or rights 
would therefore correlate with the transaction costs present in a given 
situation.214 Where transaction costs are low, bargaining becomes easy, 
and the legal rules exert less control over the eventual allocation of 
resources. As big data provides parties with significantly more 
information and reduces uncertainty about other parties, trends in the 
courts, and even external transaction costs (such as the length of time 
                                                                                                                     
 209. Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 832–
33 (2013) (discussing Coasean bargaining and property rights in the energy arena, and mentioning 
information costs as a traditional obstacle). 
 210. See Dru Stevenson, Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1645, 
1655–58 (2012) [hereinafter Stevenson, Jury Selection]; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias 
and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 623 (1998) (“Economic analysis thus 
suggests that default rules matter in only a subset of the total number of contractual relationships. 
If transaction costs are low and information is distributed symmetrically between the parties, they 
will negotiate efficient contracts regardless of the content of default rules.”). 
 211. Stevenson, Costs of Codification, supra note 191, at 1151; see Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S78 (2011); see 
also Coase, supra note 190, at 15–19; COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 191, at 178 (“The same 
approach which, with zero transaction costs, demonstrates that the allocation of resources remains 
the same whatever the legal position, also shows that, with positive transaction costs, the law 
plays a crucial role in determining how resources are used.”).  
 212. Stevenson, Costs of Codification, supra note 192, at 1151. See generally Harold 
Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972). 
 213. See COASE, THE FIRM, supra note 191, at 174–75; Ellickson, supra note 197, at 612. 
 214. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 211, at 92–99; Stevenson, Jury Selection, supra note 
210, at 1654–58. 
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typically involved in enforcing an agreement in the courts), a primary 
hurdle to agreements disappears.215  
In sum, an important implication of lawyering in the shadow of data 
is that the newly available information should facilitate more bargaining, 
agreements, settlements, and other legal transactions. As bargaining or 
consummating deals is an important part of what lawyers do, big data 
should prove incredibly useful for practitioners who strike the right 
balance between intuition, personal experience, and behavioral insights 
gleaned from aggregated legal data. At the same time, a side effect of the 
reduced information costs is that it is also easier to bargain around certain 
legal rules and assignments of rights, which could have important policy 
implications beyond the scope of this Article.216 Surprisingly, the 
Coasean implications of big data have so far received no identified 
attention in the legal academic literature, the business academic literature, 
or the social science literature. 
D.  Ambulance Chasing with Big Data 
A recent article demonstrated how mapping data from social 
networking sites precisely traced the impact of an East Coast hurricane 
on individual neighborhoods.217 The Center for Disease Control can 
monitor Google search trends to track the spread of seasonal flu 
outbreaks.218 These are well-known instances where researchers knew 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 839 
(2008) (“Coase . . . divided transaction costs into four categories: search, information, negotiation, 
and enforcement. Contrary to the neoclassical model’s assumptions of perfect information and 
costless exchange, Coase recognized that these costs distort the market, making the mathematical 
predictions of neoclassical models largely inapplicable in the real world. Every transaction cost, 
he realized, is a small market failure.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 216. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations 
in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83, 148 (2001) (“Where markets are thick, information full, and 
transaction costs low, either markets or structured negotiation backed by judicial determination 
will allow a financially distressed firm to reorganize easily in a manner consistent with absolute 
priority.”). For a similar application of transaction cost analysis to policy making outside the arena 
of big data, see Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629, 701 (2008) (“Group 
organization increases the likelihood of group-wide compliance and renders legislative threats 
more effective as catalysts of reform. Moreover, the tendency towards organization reduces the 
transaction costs of regulatory bargaining, consequently enabling legislators and groups to share 
information, negotiate, and design superior regulatory measures.”). 
 217. Taylor Shelton et al., Mapping the Data Shadows of Hurricane Sandy: Uncovering the 
Sociospatial Dimensions of ‘Big Data,’ 52 GEOFORUM 167, 178 (2014), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.01.006.  
 218. Mohammad Tufail Malik et al., “Google Flu Trends” and Emergency Department 
Triage Data Predicted the 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Waves in Manitoba, 102 CANADIAN J. PUB. 
HEALTH 294, 296 (2011), available at http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA2644814 
78&v=2.1&u=gain40375&it=r&p=HRCA&sw=w&authCount=1; Geoff Watts, Google Watches 
over Flu, 338 BRIT. MED. J. 74, 74 (2009), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20511741?orig 
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what they were looking for. Big data, however, can also show analysts 
what to look for in the first place, as patterns and correlations emerge that 
nobody would have predicted. As an example of the more conventional 
use of big data, plaintiffs’ lawyers who have heard about a major 
chemical spill219 or product recall announcement can use data culled from 
social networking sites or search engines to find as many of the victims—
potential clients—or witnesses as possible. This mimics what lawyers in 
previous generations would have done with newspaper notices and short 
television ads.  
A more novel approach, however, would be to use big data to identify 
mass torts (or even serial tortfeasors, such as a negligent contractor or 
architect) that are yet unknown.220 For example, one shipment of products 
to a particular store may have been a defective batch, resulting in 
localized or clustered injuries that are unlikely to attract media attention, 
or a particular scammer may have a spate of victims within a short period. 
In other words, big data could help identify tortfeasors as well as victims. 
Lawyers themselves could be the subjects of such searches—big data 
may eventually help state disciplinary authorities uncover unauthorized 
practice of law by non-lawyers or foreign lawyers (which often goes 
undetected now), legal malpractice, and other forms of misconduct. The 
availability of rich data can yield metrics to measure lawyer competence 
more objectively than society does at present. 
On the legal defense side, it is probably unnecessary to suggest that 
lawyers could utilize big data to identify tortfeasors or victims, as the 
                                                                                                                     
in=JSTOR-pdf; Vanja M. Dukić et al., Tracking Flu Epidemics Using Google Flu Trends and 
Particle Learning 3, 8–10 (Nov. 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1513705; Philip M. Polgreen et al., Using Internet Searches for Influenza 
Surveillance, 47 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1443, 1443, 1446 (2008), available at 
http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/47/11/1443.full.pdf (“With use of the frequency of searches, 
our models predicted an increase in cultures positive for influenza 1–3 weeks in advance of when 
they occurred (P< .001), and similar models predicted an increase in mortality attributable to 
pneumonia and influenza up to 5 weeks in advance (P< .001).”). But see Declan Butler, When 
Google Got Flu Wrong: US Outbreak Foxes a Leading Web-based Method for Tracking Seasonal 
Flu, 494 NATURE 155, 155–56 (2013), available at http://www.nature.com/news/when-google-
got-flu-wrong-1.12413 (attributing Google’s overestimates to excessive media coverage of 
seasonal flu outbreaks, which in turn triggered disproportionate internet searches about the topic); 
Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Data Without Context Tells a Misleading Story, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 
2013, 11:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/disruptions-google-flu-trends-
shows-problems-of-big-data-without-context/. 
 219. Sara Gosman, Reflecting Risk: Chemical Disclosure and Hydraulic Fracturing, 48 GA. 
L. REV. 83, 102–04 (2013) (discussing how greater information disclosures would enable more 
Coasean bargaining). 
 220. See Sharad Goel et al., Predicting Consumer Behavior with Web Search, 107 PROC. 
NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 17486, 17488–89 (2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/
pnas.1005962107 (discussing the use of big data to predict consumer behavior). 
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insurers and manufacturers that retain defense counsel are generally years 
ahead of the legal profession in the use of big data and analytics. 
Presumably, many insurers and large companies are already using big 
data to predict the location and scope of upcoming liabilities, just as 
police use it to predict the neighborhoods that need the most patrols. 
Lawyers could add to this analysis by using data analytics to predict what 
incidents will turn into class actions rather than individual lawsuits, and 
how much time defendants probably have before they face actual 
liability.  
The use of big data by potential defendants (insurers and tortfeasors) 
leads to another likely development—the impact of data availability on 
liability itself.221 Companies now have more information than before 
about their past, current, and future customers, making misuses of their 
product, as well as injuries from defects, much more foreseeable. This 
enhanced ability to foresee consumer injuries directly affects the duty of 
care, the duty to warn, the duty to recall products, and so on. It is also 
easier to trace lines of causation, both before and after an accident. In 
addition, online purchasing directly from manufacturers already 
eliminates many of the jointly liable co-defendants of the past, that is, 
retailers and distributers. 
III.  NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
So far, this Article has explored how summarizing trends and patterns 
across historical data allows lawyers to make better predictions about 
various measurable aspects of litigation. The ability to predict litigation 
outcomes in particular rests on the assumption that such outcomes are not 
entirely random. It is hardly controversial to suggest that litigation 
outcomes are not entirely random given the important role that precedent 
plays in guiding judicial decision-making. Historical litigation data lends 
itself to predictive modeling because judges, particularly district court 
judges who cannot make new law, are generally bound by the decisions 
of their appellate-level predecessors—stare decisis.222  
A.  The Predictive Value of Precedent 
The federal Judiciary’s preference for predictable decisions serves 
several salutary interests that are vital to the preservation of a healthy 
legal system. First, basic fairness dictates that judges reach similar results 
                                                                                                                     
 221. Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1796–97, 1812 
(2014). 
 222. See Stewart E. Sterk & Kimberly J. Brunelle, Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res 
Judicata Doctrine in Land Use Cases, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1147 & n.27 (2011) (noting that 
stare decisis “often leads courts to abide by past decisions . . . [but] courts should, at least 
sometimes, be free to overrule past precedent.”). 
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in similar cases.223 Predictable decisions “foster[] reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contribute[] to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.”224 Moreover, a judge who delivers rulings that are 
consistent with her previous rulings reduces legal uncertainty, which, in 
turn, allows individuals and organizations to plan their affairs with little 
fear of unanticipated legal consequences.225 The absence of predictable 
outcomes, on the other hand, stifles personal growth and economic 
progress.226 For these reasons and many more, courts have a vested 
interest in deciding issues in a manner that is consistent with precedent. 
This, in turn, enhances the predictive value of historical trends and 
patterns gleaned from litigation data analytics.227 
The fact that laws change over time does not strip historical litigation 
data of its predictive value. While some laws do indeed change, the 
change tends to be incremental, thereby reducing the number of outlier 
decisions that defy precedent. 
B.  Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Self-Defeating Predictions 
Even forward-looking forecasts based on highly predictive historical 
data, however, can and do fail for a variety of reasons worth exploring. 
Some predictions can fail due to confusion from signals and noise in the 
data set;228 others fail because of misinterpreted lines of causation; still 
others fail because of unique, unpredictable “Black Swan” events;229 and 
some predictions become self-cancelling or self-fulfilling as richer 
information becomes available to a wider range of actors. Noise–signal 
problems are not unique to law and are an ever-present hazard for any 
superficial or amateur attempt at data analysis.230 
                                                                                                                     
 223. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537 (1991). 
 224. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“In most matters it is more important 
that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.”). 
 225. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 332 (1989); see also Randy Beck, Transtemporal 
Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1408, 1428 (2012). 
 226. See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 79 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment) (“[T]he principal purposes of stare decisis . . . are to 
protect reliance interests and to foster stability in the law.”); see also HENRY M. HART JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW 568 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
 227. See Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, Knowledge Discovery from Legal 
Databases—Using Neural Networks and Data Mining to Build Legal Decision Support Systems, 
in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & LAWYERS: ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IN THE LEGAL DOMAIN 
FROM CHALLENGES TO DAILY ROUTINE 81, 87–88 (Arno R. Lodder & Anja Oskamp eds., 2006). 
 228. See generally NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS 
FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T (2012). 
 229. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE (2007) [hereinafter TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN]. 
 230. See SILVER, supra note 228, at 1, 16–17. 
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Particularly problematic for law, however, are the self-fulfilling and 
self-nullifying tendencies of certain predictions. For example, there are 
instances where statistical predictions related to law or enforcement 
become self-fulfilling or reinforcing, as when police use statistics to 
identify high-crime neighborhoods, shift resources to those 
neighborhoods, and then find that the arrest numbers, and hence the 
“crime rate,” increase or get worse.231 This is a type of feedback effect—
an informational input for decision makers skews the decisions and 
resultant outcomes toward producing more of the same information.  
In contrast, other cases illustrate how legal data becomes self-
negating, as when a court with a record of favoring plaintiffs thereby 
attracts plaintiffs with increasingly meritless cases, so eventually the 
number of cases reverts to the mean.232 This is a type of rebound effect, 
where a decision maker’s informational input affects the decisions and 
resultant outcomes in such a way as to make the information an inaccurate 
predictor. In other words, a disparity with strategic significance for 
parties, once widely known, will tend to attract marginal parties for the 
favored side and repel marginal parties for the disfavored side, so that 
outcomes eventually even out over time. Statistician-turned-columnist 
Nate Silver points to drivers’ use of GPS traffic information to find the 
least congested route across Manhattan as one example of self-defeating 
predictions; when too many drivers follow the data about the least-
congested thoroughfare, that route quickly becomes the most 
congested.233  
Assuming that predictions become easier and more accurate with the 
advent of accessible data, a crucial question for the legal system is which 
predictions carry the risk of becoming self-fulfilling and which could 
become self-defeating. The answer seems to depend primarily on two 
variables: information asymmetries and binary strategic incentives. 
Returning to Nate Silver’s work, apparently the primary factor 
determining which way a prediction will tip is whether the individual 
decision maker seeks “bandwagon benefits” or, in contrast, hopes to gain 
an insider advantage.234 Politicians hope to gain bandwagon benefits in 
the form of additional votes by courting public endorsements from 
                                                                                                                     
 231. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN 
AN ACTUARIAL AGE 156 (2007). 
 232. The “judicial-hellhole” phenomenon—where a streak of plaintiff wins creates a type of 
litigation gold rush—seems to reflect a bandwagon benefit, at least in the short term, but becomes 
self-nullifying over time due to the self-selection or screening effects of marginal plaintiffs and 
defendants. See generally Judicial Hellholes: About, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND, 
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/about/ (last visited July 1, 2015) (discussing the background of 
these “judicial hellholes”). 
 233. SILVER, supra note 228, at 219. 
 234. See id. at 260, 341–42. 
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influential celebrities.235 One study showed that, in 2008, President 
Barack Obama gained as many as one million additional votes from the 
“Oprah Effect” alone.236 Savvy politicians know that elections are won 
and lost based on crowds lurching in their direction; the most effective 
politicians know how to garner support by jumping on a bandwagon that 
has momentum.  
Infected patients—Silver’s second example237—are better off when 
there is a higher chance of a doctor’s visit yielding a quick diagnosis and 
readily available treatment, which is more likely when the disease is a 
case that the physician is seeing frequently, as in a publicized outbreak or 
minor epidemic.238 Drivers, in contrast, have the exact opposite utility 
function—they want the road less traveled, or at least the one less 
congested at that moment.239 For litigants, the same dichotomy is also 
supremely important in determining which way legal predictions will tip. 
These examples highlight how strategic incentives—especially in two-
sided competitions or instances with binary choices—can turn 
informational richness into a self-cancelling or self-fulfilling 
phenomenon.  
Yet information asymmetries also play a critical role in deciding the 
reliability of predictions, especially in determining whether a prediction 
will trend at all toward self-fulfillment or self-defeat or whether the 
original prediction will prove accurate. Bandwagon benefits tend to occur 
where information is widely distributed among decision makers in the 
same “ecosystem” (for example, traffic patterns and celebrity 
endorsements). Private information, on the other hand, leads to 
information asymmetry, which changes the dynamic by eliminating 
crowd responses and allowing one party to exploit the prediction to the 
disadvantage of another. With crowd-response examples, public 
information is desirable for those seeking bandwagon benefits, as 
bandwagon effects thrive on information feedback loops. When 
incentives are more competitive, rather than collaborative, public 
information eliminates many chances for opportunism by the parties, as 
everyone is on equal footing, can glean from the same predictions, and 
can predict the reactions of others to the original predictions.  
Litigation is inherently competitive, and access to PACER data, at 
least on the scale required for super crunching, is prohibitively expensive 
                                                                                                                     
 235. Id. at 47–49. 
 236. See generally Craig Garthwaite & Timothy J. Moore, Can Celebrity Endorsements 
Affect Political Outcomes? Evidence from the 2008 U.S. Democratic Presidential Primary, 29 
J.L. ECO. & ORG. 355 (2012). 
 237. See SILVER, supra note 228, at 204–32. 
 238. See id. at 218–19.  
 239. See id. at 219. 
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for many litigants.240 Predictions based on big (legal) data can become 
self-fulfilling or self-nullifying depending on the degree of information 
asymmetry present in a given case and the extent to which the parties’ 
incentives are a zero-sum game. If all the parties know, for instance, that 
a particular judge or jurisdiction is more favorable to plaintiffs, the 
tendency will be for marginal defendants to avoid the forum if at all 
possible and for marginal plaintiffs to seek it. This, in turn, will 
eventually lead to fewer plaintiff-friendly outcomes as the number of 
frivolous cases rises. Thus, widely available information—low 
informational asymmetry—coupled with an incentive to beat the crowds 
will normally yield self-defeating predictions as rich data becomes 
increasingly accessible to the masses. 
On the other hand, a type of bandwagon effect for lawyers can occur 
where a jurisdiction has a large body of precedents on an issue, as this 
benefits all parties by reducing uncertainty and fostering earlier 
settlements. In that case, the information becomes self-reinforcing. The 
widely available information in this scenario, combined with bandwagon 
benefits, yields self-fulfilling prophecies. 
In litigation, as in military conflict, business, politics, and just about 
any other competitive facet of life, success often depends on access to 
information. Better intelligence leads to more accurate predictions and 
smarter decisions. In the context of litigation, this might include 
predictions about the strategic advantages and disadvantages of filing a 
lawsuit in a particular forum, which arguments will appeal to a particular 
judge, the type of tactics to anticipate from the opposing counsel, the cost 
of litigating a case to trial, and the list goes on. Recognizing that relevant 
information is a valuable resource in the adversarial context of a lawsuit, 
law firms and their clients are willing to pay sizeable sums for access to 
the vast trove of information stored in Westlaw and Lexis. Some have 
gone so far as to accuse wealthier litigants who are able to afford access 
to unpublished opinions compiled by Westlaw or Lexis as gaining an 
unfair advantage over their adversaries without such access.241 Thus, the 
predictive value of legal data in the context of litigation will sometimes 
depend on information asymmetries. The degree of asymmetry will, in 
                                                                                                                     
 240. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 241. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 78 (2005) (“In the past, some have also argued that, without 
no-citation rules, large institutional litigants (such as the Department of Justice) who can afford 
to collect and organize ‘unpublished’ opinions would have an unfair advantage.”); Lauren K. 
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 955–59 (1989) (describing how repeat 
litigants gain an advantage over one-time litigants by circulating unpublished opinions among 
lawyers to help make decisions regarding case strategy, settlement, and whether to appeal). 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/7
2015] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF BIG DATA 1385 
 
some cases, determine whether the information remains advantageous for 
its users or becomes self-defeating over time.  
Information asymmetries will likely remain prevalent given the high 
costs required to access, aggregate, process, and analyze large pools of 
litigation data.242 The last two decades have already seen a widening gap 
in the financial status of firms and parties,243 and this gap will translate 
into wide gaps in how much information each side is willing or able to 
purchase. To the extent that asymmetries prevail, the observations and 
predictions from big (legal) data will generally avoid becoming self-
defeating or self-fulfilling and will instead merely work to the advantage 
of the side with better intelligence. 
From a public policy standpoint, self-negation of information can 
produce a social good. For example, it can produce more consistency or 
uniformity between judges, which serves the goal of having similar 
litigants obtain equal results in every court. A judge may feel concern for 
his reputation if the data reveals a pattern of bias, delay, or haste, and the 
judge could accelerate the pace of self-correction of the prediction by 
modifying his own behavior. The information would self-correct 
eventually anyway, as parties will become aware of the bias and settle 
before trial or become aware of the delays or haste and seek other venues. 
Self-negation could also lead to earlier settlements where defendants 
determine, from an actuarial standpoint, that they stand to lose more by 
testing their luck at trial rather than settling the matter at the outset of 
litigation.  
C.  Black Swans 
Surprise events can upset predictions, especially those based on the 
frequency of prior occurrences. Natural and man-made disasters, if they 
strike by surprise, can interrupt court processes, abruptly alter public 
opinion (thus impacting jurors, parties, and judges), and can disrupt 
markets (including currency values), which can change the stakes of a 
given case. Even personal events that come as a surprise—a judge or 
lawyer who has to step aside due to health problems—can nullify even a 
well-researched, well-analyzed prediction. Such “shocks” are ironically 
a familiar part of life, of course. The other side of the equation, however, 
is the tendency for predictions to foster systemic fragility. This is the core 
insight of bestselling author Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his trilogy on 
                                                                                                                     
 242. See supra Part I. 
 243. Donald E. Vinson, The Objective Edge: Third Party Assessment in Litigation Risk 
Analysis, VINSON RESOLUTION MGMT., http://vinres.com/blog-2/litigation-risk-analysis/ (last 
visited July 1, 2015). 
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uncertainty—Fooled by Randomness,244 The Black Swan,245 and 
Antifragile246—that information abundance and the aggregate of 
predictive decisions can create an entirely new set of looming disasters, 
apart from what nature serves up.  
Predictions and information present hazards in three ways: (1) 
decision makers tend to be overconfident when relying on forecasts, so 
they take more risks; (2) forecasters and decision makers tend to 
undervalue low-probability, high-stakes risks; and (3) over time, entire 
systems (institutional strategies and processes) grow up around the 
information so that sudden variations can cause exponentially greater 
catastrophes due to the increased interdependency within the entity.247 
Systemic efficiency—the elimination of redundancies, usually by 
centralized planning—makes systems more fragile, more like a house of 
cards. The insidious flipside of the “too big to fail” idea is that the same 
entities have become too big not to fail.248 Taleb contrasts “fragile” 
institutions and individuals with those that are “robust”—independent 
enough to endure systemic shocks and unforeseen events.249 Nature offers 
many examples of robustness—the ability of vegetation to regrow after 
defoliation, animal populations rebounding after an epidemic, and so 
forth. A third category—much rarer, and to Taleb, much more 
desirable—is what he dubs “antifragile,” that is, individuals and entities 
that benefit from shocks of all types.250 In the abstract, the legal 
profession is quite robust as evidenced by its antiquity. In the American 
context, the legal profession has even been rather antifragile, as Taleb 
would define the term, since sudden events causing social upheaval—
catastrophic storms, wars, plane crashes, mass torts, crime sprees, market 
spikes or collapses, etc.—often create a gold rush for lawyers.  
Yet the legal profession is changing in the age of big data. The 
availability of tools for harvesting insights from big (legal) data enables 
tighter coordination between parties, lawyers, and judges, because each 
of these players has access to far more information about the others, and 
can more accurately predict their responses to various courses of action. 
Reduced information costs, as a subset of transaction costs, foster more 
bargaining and yield earlier, more frequent agreements. Tighter 
                                                                                                                     
 244. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN 
THE MARKETS AND IN LIFE (2001). 
 245. TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN, supra note 229. 
 246. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER (2012) 
[hereinafter TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE]. 
 247. See TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN, supra note 229, at 211. 
 248. Cf. Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 778 (2011) (discussing the United States’ refusal to debar a company 
because the company was “too big to debar”). 
 249. See TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE, supra note 246, at 20–21. 
 250. Id. at 20–21, 85. 
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coordination means greater efficiency in that the reduction in information 
costs, as a subset of transaction costs, encourages bargaining in a greater 
number of cases and at an earlier stage in the pretrial litigation process. 
Thus, practitioners are beginning to step outside of the shadow of trial 
and are instead beginning to make important value judgments about their 
case in the shadow of data. 
The downside is that tighter coordination raises the stakes for systemic 
errors or systemic effects from a breakdown in any part of the 
arrangement. This is not a reason to eschew big data, but rather an 
inherent feature of it that users should keep in mind. Taleb’s main insight 
is not that unpredictable events happen, but that modern economic and 
political systems are more vulnerable to systemic shocks or disruptions 
because their tight coordination centers on precise, statistical predictions 
that allow no room for error, play, or disruption by a low-probability 
event.  
Taleb’s random events, “Black Swan” scenarios, and fragile systems 
are largely a response to the advent of big-data-based decision-making in 
the financial sectors (and also in the healthcare and educational systems, 
which have become increasingly complex but also increasingly 
interdependent). Simply put, data—especially statistical data—fosters 
interdependency in complex systems, and interdependency carries the 
inherent potential for system-wide disruptions or catastrophes. As the 
legal system begins to embrace the amazing potential of big data, these 
authors expect more interdependency and tighter coordination as 
statistical predictions furnish the basis for more decisions by lawyers, 
parties, and judges. Such increased interdependency, of course, increases 
the vulnerability to systemic disruptions or shocks. Again, this is not a 
reason to avoid big data, but it is something that sophisticated users of the 
data should recognize and for which they may want to compensate or 
hedge in some way. 
D.  Ethical Considerations 
This Section discusses ethical issues that the rise of big data presents 
for legal practitioners and data-analytic firms. It starts with consideration 
of the prohibition against sharing fees with nonlawyers as implicated by 
the costs of parsing all of this data. It then addresses the potential big data 
has to create conflict-of-interest issues. Finally, it looks at the ways big 
data might change the lawyer’s duty of care in the malpractice setting. 
1.  Unauthorized Practice of Law and Fee Sharing with 
Nonlawyer Owners 
Does big data present new ethical quandaries or pitfalls for lawyers? 
Josh Blackman has raised several points that he believes present looming 
ethical problems for companies like Lex Machina that provide data 
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analytics to lawyers.251 First, Blackman predicts that legal-data-analytic 
firms, which generally have lawyers and nonlawyers among their owners, 
will soon provide services that constitute the practice of law in violation 
of Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which bars fee 
sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers.252 He writes that “[i]t is only a 
matter of time before several players in the field who are coy about the 
manner in which they are structured are going to have to deal with this 
[Rule].”253 
Blackman’s worries assume that data-analytic firms will: (1) engage 
in the practice of law as defined by state bars; (2) have nonlawyer owners 
when they do; and (3) base their operations outside Washington, D.C., 
which permits fee-sharing with nonlawyers.254 At present, these authors 
are not aware of any data-analytic firms providing anything more than a 
sophisticated search engine for an online archive of legal information—
no more the practice of law, say, than the familiar Westlaw or Lexis 
database services. Westlaw and Lexis both provide limited customer 
service or telephone assistance with searches, which to date have not been 
seriously challenged as the practice of law. Blackman seems to be 
suggesting that (in response to inevitable market demand) some data-
analytic firms will go a step further and provide personal-consultant or 
data-concierge services through which a nonlawyer entrepreneur could 
obtain specific advice about where to file a lawsuit, whether to respond 
to a demand letter, and so on.255 These authors are skeptical that the data-
analytic firms will wade into such murky waters—their specialty, and the 
value-addition of their service, lies entirely in their database and search 
features, not with operating a clumsy legal-help call center where lawyers 
provide each caller with anonymous representation from within a cubicle. 
Nevertheless, concerns about variations on this idea are bound to arise, 
so it seems appropriate to work through the issues here for the sake of 
argument.  
Blackman later raises the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) as a 
separate point: “Reading graphs to offer advice on how a case should 
settle, or where it should transfer to, is at its heart the practice of law. That 
an algorithm spit it out doesn’t really matter.”256 As mentioned above, 
                                                                                                                     
 251. Josh Blackman, The Looming Ethical Issues for Legal Analytics, JOSH BLACKMAN’S 
BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/02/18/the-looming-ethical-issues-for-
legal-analytics/. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 13-464 (2013). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. 
52
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/7
2015] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF BIG DATA 1389 
 
defining the practice of law for disciplinary purposes is a necessary 
antecedent for his first point about sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, so 
it seems more appropriate to address these issues together. Applying the 
UPL issue to data analytics, Blackman asserts, “Non-lawyers, or even 
lawyers not working for a law firm, are unable to give this type of advice. 
Data-analytics firms should tread carefully about handing out this type of 
personalized advice outside the context of the attorney client 
relationship.”257 
The first step in responding to these concerns, therefore, is to address 
the issue of whether the activities performed by these data-analytic firms 
will fall within the definition of practicing law. Unfortunately, there is no 
clear, much less uniform, definition for this phrase. Few, if any, state bars 
have provided a clear definition of what constitutes “the practice of law,” 
but certain actions have clearly fallen under this rubric—preparing and 
filing legal forms or pleadings and appearing as a client’s representative 
before a tribunal are regularly featured.258 The American Bar Association 
(ABA) concedes that there is no clear definition of the “practice of law,” 
but it suggests functional proxies: “Although there is no single, 
specific definition of the practice of law, functionally the practice of law 
‘relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional 
judgment of a lawyer.’”259 Merely providing descriptive information or 
analysis to lawyers or other customers, which is the current service 
provided by the data-analytic firms, is no more the practice of law than 
the algorithmic Google Trends or WestlawNext, albeit with richer data 
and interesting graphs and charts. If a data-analytic firm took the unusual 
step of drafting forms or filing documents on behalf of customers, outside 
the patent, trademark, Social Security, or immigration arenas, this would 
probably constitute representation and the provision of legal services.  
The result, however, is less clear for the provision of consulting 
services. Jury consultants, who provide empirical-based advice about the 
likely biases or leanings of prospective or actual jurors, are pervasive in 
the legal system, though most are nonlawyer sociologists, psychologists, 
and so forth. Before Lex Machina or similar analytic firms begin offering 
services that verge on the practice of law, jury consultant firms are likely 
to use these resources to provide additional services to lawyers, and it 
seems unlikely that they would thereby trigger accusations of UPL. The 
ABA has issued no opinion letters about jury consultants, and there are 
no published opinions indicating that jury consultants have ever faced 
prosecution for UPL. 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Id. 
 258. See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, 859 N.E.2d 930, 932 (Ohio 2006) (“With few 
exceptions . . . the unauthorized practice of law occurs when a layperson prepares legal pleadings 
and other papers for filing in court on another's behalf without the supervision of a licensed 
attorney.”). 
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In a published formal opinion in 2008, when the ABA approved of 
legal outsourcing by law firms to lawyers and nonlawyers, the ABA 
refused to define what might constitute UPL by an outsourced nonlawyer: 
Finally, the outsourcing lawyer must be mindful of the 
admonition of Rule 5.5(a) to avoid assisting others to 
“practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation 
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction . . . .” This 
Committee lacks the authority to express an opinion as to 
whether the provision of legal services by any particular 
lawyer, nonlawyer, or intermediary constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law. Ordinarily, an individual who 
is not admitted to practice law in a particular jurisdiction 
may work for a lawyer who is so admitted, provided that the 
lawyer remains responsible for the work being performed 
and that the individual is not held out as being a duly 
admitted lawyer. We note only that if the activities of a 
lawyer, nonlawyer, or intermediary employed in an 
outsourcing capacity are held to be the unauthorized practice 
of law, and the outsourcing lawyer facilitated that violation 
of law by action or inaction, the outsourcing lawyer will 
have violated Rule 5.5(a).260  
A survey of earlier ABA opinions is more illuminating. The historical 
trend has been to find improper fee sharing with lawyers—overlapped 
with UPL by the nonlawyers—almost exclusively in situations where the 
nonlawyer received contingent fees tied to the outcome of a case. For 
example, in a 1986 opinion about lawyers hiring outside researchers, the 
ABA forbade the payment of contingent fees to research corporations but 
did not forbid hiring them on an hourly basis: 
A corporation (the Corporation) is engaged in the business 
of providing legal research and analysis services to lawyers. 
In rendering these services the Corporation contracts only 
with lawyers. Its professional staff consists of law graduates, 
most of whom are licensed to practice in at least one 
American jurisdiction. The Corporation is not a professional 
law corporation and a substantial portion of its stock is 
owned by persons who are not lawyers. The Corporation has 
always billed on an hourly basis for its services to lawyers. 
It is now considering a contingent fee arrangement for 
situations where lawyers contemplate using the 
Corporation’s services on a more extensive or continuing 
basis in the course of more complex matters, including 
complex litigation.261 
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The ABA reached a similar conclusion in 1980 regarding lawyers who 
work for research firms that provide “sophisticated economic and 
economic-related analysis to enable lawyers to deal with problems for 
which such analysis is useful.”262 The owners of the research firm were 
lawyers and a nonlawyer economist.263 The opinion described the 
services in terms that resemble those that Blackman contemplates the 
data-analytic firms will soon offer: 
This organization provides to lawyers advice on the most 
promising lines of economic argument, names of possible 
economic witnesses, consultation with witnesses, conducts 
economic studies to assist witnesses in testimony, and 
prepares comprehensive memoranda analyzing the facts as 
they bear on the economic issues in cases. . . . This 
consulting corporation, as described, does not preempt the 
attorney-client relationship. The final responsibility and 
supervisory powers remain with the attorney who hires this 
corporation. Your letter requesting a Committee opinion 
does not reveal in what manner the corporation is paid for its 
services to attorneys. In order to avoid ethical violations, the 
consulting corporation’s compensation would have to be 
computed without regard to the legal fees collected by the 
attorneys requesting this service. Since employees of the 
corporation, or its agents, might be used as witnesses at 
trial[,] . . . it would be a violation of DR 7-109(C)(1)(3) to 
arrange a contingent fee agreement. Even if the consulting 
corporation had no witness role in a trial, a contingent fee 
agreement between attorney and his non-lawyer employees 
is forbidden . . . . [A]n accountant employee of a law firm 
must be “paid a regular salary computed without regard to 
fees collected for legal services rendered to particular 
clients.” If the corporation is not practicing law, the monies 
paid to it by the employing attorney are not legal fees. Thus 
income can be ethically shared among lawyers and non-
lawyers alike.264 
The foregoing opinions illustrate how the definition of “practicing 
law” appears to blur with the analysis of whether fee sharing with 
nonlawyers occurs. The dispositive question thus appears to be whether 
the consulting firm bills its clients on a contingent fee basis—hourly or 
flat-fee billing appears to avoid any violations of the Model Rules.265 
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Similarly, the ABA in 1987 took a dim view of “medical-legal 
consultants” primarily because the fee arrangement included contingent 
fees: 
The Consultant provides an initial “work product consultant 
report,” usually through its “Medical Directors,” 
consultation of its Medical Directors and, when a case so 
warrants, assistance to the lawyer with depositions of expert 
witnesses and opposing parties and at trial. It makes 
available expert witnesses from its “independent consulting 
staff.” The Consultant offers services on a direct fee or 
contingent fee basis. The direct fee contract requires the 
client to pay agreed fees for certain services (including an 
“expert report charge” and a “testimony service charge” for 
each expert provided by the Consultant), reimbursable 
expenses, and all charges by the expert witnesses provided 
by Consultant (which are paid to the expert witnesses). The 
Consultant offers three contingent fee options: (1) a 
modified contingency fee of 20% of the total recovery under 
which the client pays a reduced report fee, reimbursable 
expenses and agreed reduced fees to expert witnesses; (2) a 
straight contingency fee of 30% of the total recovery under 
which the client pays only reimbursable expenses and no 
                                                                                                                     
[The Institute] advertises that it offers ‘a full research organization for attorneys’ 
promising a work product which will be presented in a ‘creative, influential and 
convincing manner.’ This service is stated by the advertisements to be available 
only to attorneys and to be performed by attorneys employed by The Institute. 
The Institute enters into contractual arrangements based upon an estimated fee 
with its customers at the outset of its service and bills them from time to time 
with the anticipation that it will make a profit. It, of course, compensates the 
attorneys working for The Institute in accordance with separate arrangements 
made with them. The Institute states it plans no contact with clients of individual 
attorneys and plans to limit its advertising to journals such as The American Bar 
Association Journal distributed primarily, but not exclusively, to members of the 
Bar. 
The ABA Ethics Committee concluded that this was clearly unauthorized practice of law: 
At the outset it must be pointed out that the corporation in question is not a 
professional association or corporation of lawyers, permissible under DR 2-
102(B). Rather it is nothing more or less than a typical corporation for profit, 
utilizing lawyers for the performance of legal services for other lawyers. 
Ordinarily the definition of practice of law is a matter for which this Committee 
declines responsibility. However, we have little hesitancy in this instance in 
concluding that this is a classic case of an unauthorized practice of law and that 
lawyer participation is thus forbidden by DR 3-101(A). 
Id. 
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fees for services of the Consultant or the expert witnesses 
provided by the Consultant; and (3) a fee to “maximize 
recovery” after a settlement offer which works like the 
straight contingency fee arrangement except that the 
percentage is negotiated and applies only to the amount of 
the recovery in excess of the settlement offer.266  
At present, it seems that data-analytic firms will probably shield 
themselves from nonlawyer fee sharing or UPL accusations by marketing 
themselves to lawyers and law firms (including in-house counsel at 
corporations), refraining from offering case-specific strategic advice or 
predictions, and including disclaimers that their information does not 
constitute legal advice. Firms that want to branch out into case-specific 
consulting should probably package themselves similar to jury 
consultants like DecisionQuest, Malekpour & Ball, or High Impact, 
which tout themselves as full-service trial consultants.267 If a new data-
analytic startup were to base its headquarters in the District of Columbia 
(regardless of its server locations), law firms could share fees with 
them.268 They would need to avoid charging contingent fees, though, as 
that has been the historical tripwire for the ABA to find outsourcing 
improper. 
That nonlawyer ownership of law firms, within certain parameters, is 
permitted in the District of Columbia was recognized by another recent 
ABA Opinion: 
In contrast to the Model Rule, District of Columbia Rule 
5.4(b) permits “an individual nonlawyer who performs 
professional services which assist the organization in 
providing legal services to clients” to hold an ownership 
interest in a law firm; and District of Columbia Rule 5.4(a) 
permits the sharing of legal fees with such persons . . . A fee-
sharing issue may arise when a lawyer undertakes the 
representation of a client in a matter that involves the 
services of another lawyer or law firm governed by different 
rules. For example, a lawyer in a Model Rules jurisdiction 
may reasonably conclude that the client requires the 
assistance of a specific lawyer in a District of Columbia firm, 
in which a nonlawyer happens to hold an ownership interest, 
on a matter involving federal government contracts because 
that lawyer is uniquely qualified in such matters. With 
                                                                                                                     
 266. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l. Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-354 (1987). 
 267. See About Us: Overview, DECISIONQUEST, http://www.decisionquest.com/Public/AboutUs/i 
ndex.cfm (last visited July 1, 2015); About M&B, MALEKPOUR & BALL, http://malekpourball.com/ 
(last visited July 1, 2015); About Us: Our Company, HIGH IMPACT, http://highimpact.com/our-
company (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 268. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 13-464 (2013). 
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informed client consent, the two lawyers may work together 
on the matter. If the requirements of Model Rule 1.5(e) are 
met, a typical fee arrangement in such matters is for the 
client to receive a single billing for the work of both lawyers. 
In this situation, there may be a question whether the lawyer 
from the Model Rules jurisdiction, by participating in this 
common inter-firm fee arrangement, shares a legal fee in 
violation of Model Rule 5.4(a) because the District of 
Columbia firm’s portion of the fee will presumably become 
part of that firm’s overall revenues, revenues from which 
distributions may ultimately be made to the nonlawyer who 
holds an ownership interest.269  
If a data-analytic firm with nonlawyer owners was to base its 
operations in Washington, D.C., law firms in other jurisdictions could 
share fees with the lawyers employed by the data firm.270 Given that their 
services are entirely online (with some additional phone service), there is 
no reason that they could not incorporate and register their business in 
D.C. as opposed to Silicon Valley.  
It is also worth mentioning that there is wide variation in how states 
enforce the rules against UPL. For example, a number of states have an 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Commission that functions somewhat 
separately from the state bar disciplinary authority.271 The Commission 
may even have a different definition of UPL than the state entity that 
promulgates ethics opinions or the entity that reprimands or disbars 
lawyers.  
2.  Conflicts of Interest 
Next, Blackman identified conflicts of interest as a likely problem for 
big data: “[T]hey will need to put safeguards into place to ensure that they 
are not offering advice to adverse parties, or more likely, clients who may 
                                                                                                                     
 269. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 13-464 (2013). 
 270. See id. 
Lawyers subject to the Model Rules may work with other lawyers or law firms 
practicing in jurisdictions [such as the District of Columbia] with rules that 
permit sharing legal fees with nonlawyers. Where there is a single billing to a 
client in such situations, a lawyer subject to the Model Rules may divide a legal 
fee with a lawyer or law firm in the other jurisdiction, even if the other lawyer or 
law firm might eventually distribute some portion of the fee to a nonlawyer, 
provided that there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional 
judgment. 
Id. 
 271. See, e.g., About Us, TEXAS UPL COMMITTEE, http://www.txuplc.org/Home/about (last 
visited July 1, 2015). 
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have interests adverse to another client.”272 To the extent that these data 
firms have outside funders or venture capitalists, this would further 
complicate the range of potential conflicts of interest.273 Moreover, 
Blackman expects that the data firms will want to harvest data from their 
clients, as well as provide information, in order to enrich their database 
and enhance their algorithms.274 Blackman anticipates that users of these 
services would find it objectionable that their search trails would be 
visible—even partly or indirectly—to litigation opponents.275  
Presumably, user history will be invisible to other users, or invisibility 
or anonymous searching will at least be an option for users, as is the case 
with online sites like YouTube and LinkedIn. Even so, user-informed 
algorithms produce results from which sophisticated users could, in 
theory, infer information about other users, especially when one’s 
litigation opponent is the only other user likely to have searched for 
information about one’s firm, one’s client, the judge assigned to the case, 
and so on. Most cases, even for seasoned litigators, have unique 
combinations of parties, counsel, experts, and judges. Just as Google’s 
autocomplete feature in its search box reveals information about the most 
common searches around the world beginning with the letters typed so 
far, if a data-analytic site were to have a similar autocomplete feature, it 
could reveal search queries by an opposing party. 
In response to these concerns, this Article first offers the observation 
that this concern raised by Blackman runs counter to his concerns about 
sharing fees with nonlawyers and UPL because the conflicts of interest 
rules will not apply unless the data firms are, or include, lawyers engaged 
in the practice of law. Conversely, if a big data firm turns out to be 
lawyers providing legal, but mostly statistics-based, services for clients, 
rules about conflicts would apply but concerns about UPL would not. 
Sharing legal fees with nonlawyers would also be less likely problematic. 
Moving on to the rules about conflicts of interest, the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct cover conflicts of interest starting with the 
basics at Rule 1.7, then address special types of conflicts of interest in 
Rule 1.8, including the use of “information relating to representation of a 
client to the disadvantage of the client.”276 Both Rules 1.7 and 1.8, 
however, have consent-waiver provisions with low thresholds.277 Data-
analytic firms providing services to lawyers will presumably obtain 
informed consent from users as part of their boilerplate terms and 
conditions of use. The services, as they function now, present no more 
                                                                                                                     
 272. Blackman, supra note 251. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. 
 276. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.8(b). 
 277. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8. 
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conflict of interest than would Westlaw or Lexis providing search results 
to litigation opponents who use their services at the same time. Even if 
these firms eventually offer concierge or individualized consulting 
services, the potential conflicts implicated are not any greater than a jury 
consultant who represents different firms and who at times has been on 
different sides of litigation or transactions regarding certain parties. Rule 
1.8(b)’s prohibition applies only to the use of information that 
disadvantages a client,278 so non-injurious use of data harvested by the 
entity from its clients would not necessarily trigger a violation of Rule 
1.8 unless the client could demonstrate harm, which seems unimaginable. 
3.  Legal Malpractice 
Blackman’s third ethical concern pertains to legal malpractice 
insurance.279 He offers a hypothetical of a big data firm that advises a user 
to file suit in a particular forum or venue based on the favorable patterns 
there, but fails to account for a recent change in the law in that 
jurisdiction, which ensures an unfavorable outcome from now on.280 
Blackman sees this as a potential malpractice suit, and he expresses 
concern that data-analytic firms will not carry malpractice insurance.281 
He writes that “[i]n most jurisdictions, active lawyers are required to 
maintain some level of malpractice insurance to protect against this.”282  
Actually, only one state—Oregon—requires lawyers to carry legal 
malpractice insurance.283 A few states require lawyers to provide notice 
                                                                                                                     
 278. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.8(b). 
 279. See Blackman, supra note 251. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth 
(Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 472 
n.339 (“Oregon is the only American jurisdiction to require malpractice insurance of all lawyers 
who are admitted to practice in the state. As of Aug. 9, 2011, seven jurisdictions require disclosure 
directly to the client of the lawyer’s failure to maintain malpractice insurance. Another seventeen 
jurisdictions require lawyers to report their lack of malpractice insurance on their annual 
registration statements.” (citation omitted)); Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield 
of Unintended Consequences—The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 717, 729–30 (1997) (“Some LLP and LLC statutes provide that the liability shield only 
applies if the LLP or LLC carries some requisite amount of insurance coverage. Other statutes do 
not condition liability protection on maintaining some level of insurance or providing evidence of 
financial responsibility.” (footnote omitted)); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1549, 1588 (2009) (“[L]egal malpractice insurance is not required in the United States in 
order to practice law.”); Martin C. McWilliams Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyers’ Mistakes?—
Against Limited Liability, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 885, 948 (2004) (“As of this writing only one state 
requires lawyers to carry insurance, and in other states movements to require legal malpractice 
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to clients that the lawyer is uninsured at the beginning of representation—
a mere formality, fine print in the retainer agreement.284 And a few states 
require all LLCs and LLPs—not only lawyers, but certainly including 
them—to carry a minimum amount of liability insurance, usually 
$100,000.285 Thus, firms using the corporate form of LLC or LLP in those 
states are required to have liability insurance, but not necessarily legal 
malpractice insurance in particular. In general, therefore, lawyers in 
forty-nine states do not have to carry professional malpractice insurance, 
thus making the data-analytic firms no different than most lawyers in 
regard to required malpractice insurance coverage.  
According to a 2013 survey of the seven largest legal malpractice 
insurers in the country, conflicts of interest generated the lion’s share of 
malpractice claims, with “procedural errors” and “failure to 
know/properly apply law” tied as distant seconds (only one-fourth as 
common as conflicts as the cause).286 The category of “litigation errors” 
(it is unclear how this was distinguished from “procedural errors”) was 
the least common cause of malpractice claims that the survey actually 
reported.287 
Returning to Blackman’s hypothetical in which a nonlawyer 
consultant gives misinformed advice about where to file a suit,288 liability 
for malpractice, again, depends heavily on the firm meeting some 
definition of the practice of law. There is no clear definition—and legal 
malpractice cases against nonlawyers are extraordinarily rare. This 
scenario is analogous to legal malpractice suits against jury consultants—
again, rare or nonexistent. Moreover, a legal malpractice action typically 
requires the plaintiff to prove damages and causation—that the case could 
have prevailed but for the defendant’s negligence. It is not clear under 
Blackman’s example that the party could not refile the case in another 
jurisdiction, thus resolving the harm and undermining a malpractice 
claim. 
 
                                                                                                                     
insurance have failed.” (footnote omitted)); Carole Silver, Regulating International Lawyers: The 
Legal Consultant Rules, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 527, 535 (2005) (noting that seventeen states require 
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 284. Walther, supra note 283, at 392–93. 
 285. Id. at 391 & n.205, 392–93. 
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E.  Privacy 
Recent academic commentary about big data has focused 
disproportionately on privacy concerns,289 and these authors hope to turn 
the discussion in another direction. This Article does not offer a full-
blown rebuttal to the alarmist, Orwellian predictions of others, as that 
would turn this Article into yet another piece focused on an overdone 
subject. It seems appropriate to provide a brief justification for the 
authors’ call to move beyond the excessive hand-wringing about big data 
and personal privacy.290 
Academic fretting about privacy began midcentury as a legitimate 
reaction against McCarthyism,291 but became overblown in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s as an artifact of the narcissism and hyper-individualism of the 
culture in that era. The endless dire predictions that this country was on 
the verge of totalitarianism, or an American version of the Night of the 
Long Knives,292 now seem like a vestigial pushback against the Red Scare 
of the 1950’s. The much-feared rounding up of political dissidents, 
freethinkers, or sexual experimenters never materialized again. The 
public discussion of privacy rights has evolved, of course. Now writers 
seem concerned not only with buffering the power of a modernized 
surveillance state, but also with the perceived information asymmetries 
between consumers and marketers—the “big corporations” that will 
supposedly injure our society with targeted advertising. There is no need 
to add to the growing supply of academic writing about the evils of 
companies showing citizens the products and services most relevant for 
their age group, gender, and geography.  
A similar strain of alarmist literature centers on a phobia that societal 
taboos will be easier to enforce if people cannot hide their vices. Yet this 
is not as much of a problem with privacy as it is with the fact that this 
country’s taboos are changing, so there are divergent sets of values or 
taboos that groups seek to impose on each other. There are emerging 
taboos against racism, misogyny, and other forms of bigotry; greater 
transparency would help new norms of tolerance to emerge. 
The second reason for moving beyond the tired privacy discussion 
flows from this last point about the new values in this society. This Article 
suggests that the country cannot pull together its balkanized factions and 
newly-arrived subcultures without greater transparency—anonymity and 
community are inherently in tension. 
                                                                                                                     
 289. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
A seismic shift is underway in the legal profession, whereby lawyers 
are increasingly supplementing their intuition and practice experience 
with insights gleaned from big (legal) data to inform their judgment. The 
increasing accessibility of legal data and continued refinement of the 
analytics for mining it will alter the skillset and approach of lawyers who 
embrace these tools. The analytics platforms that are facilitating this shift 
will not, however, supplant practicing attorneys; rather, these platforms 
will complement practitioners’ skills, knowledge, and experience. While 
algorithms may be able to process and summarize trends and patterns in 
historical litigation data far more accurately and efficiently than their 
human counterparts, it is ultimately the lawyer’s job to draw on her 
experience and intuition to determine which trends and patterns are 
relevant to a given situation and how to act on such insight.  
Even so, the point here has not been to promote technophilia. 
Tempering exuberance for new predictive tools should be a more 
reflective, nuanced approach to predictions generally—a recognition that 
predictions can backfire, become self-fulfilling, or can even create new 
systemic risks or institutional fragility. Knowing the limitations of a 
method or technology ultimately makes it more useful. Risks and 
recklessness are not necessarily the same.  
This Article’s discussion has therefore been primarily descriptive but 
also modestly normative. The descriptive portions explained the new 
platforms that are available for legal data analysis, and the normative 
portions explored the pros and cons of using these tools in practice. Most 
advances in technology merely made lawyers more efficient at doing the 
same tasks they were already doing. Big data changes the nature of 
making legal predictions—and thereby promises to change the role of 
lawyers overall. 
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